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Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 276
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Oktober 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 196mm x 10mm
- Gewicht: 318g
- ISBN-13: 9781107691322
- ISBN-10: 110769132X
- Artikelnr.: 60898059
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
Satya R. Chakravarty is a Professor of Economics at the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata. He received a bachelor degree in Statistics in 1976, a master degree in economics in 1977 and a doctorate in economics in 1981 from the Indian Statistical Institute. Professor Chakravarty worked as a Visiting Professor at the University of British Columbia, Canada (1984-5), the University of Karlsruhe, Germany (1988-90) with a grant from the German Research Foundation, the Bar Ilan University, Israel (1990, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2010), the Kagawa University, Japan (1996-7 and 2000), the Paris School of Economics, Paris, France (1997-8) with a grant from the French Ministry of Education, the Chinese University of Hong Kong (1998), the Bocconi University, Milan, Italy (2002-3 and 2006-7) and the Yokohama National University, Japan (2009). Professor Chakravarty's main areas of interest are welfare economics, public economics, mathematical finance, industrial organization and game theory. His work spans theoretical, empirical and policy analysis.
Preface
1. Introduction and motivation page
2. Basics and preliminaries
3. The core and some related solutions
4. The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus
5. The Shapley value
6. The core, Shapley value and Weber set
7. Voting games
8. Mathematical matching
9. Non-transferable utility cooperative games
10. Linear programming
11. Algorithmic aspects of cooperative game theory
12. Weighted majority games
13. Stable matching algorithm
References
Index.
Preface
1. Introduction and motivation page
2. Basics and preliminaries
3. The core and some related solutions
4. The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus
5. The Shapley value
6. The core, Shapley value and Weber set
7. Voting games
8. Mathematical matching
9. Non-transferable utility cooperative games
10. Linear programming
11. Algorithmic aspects of cooperative game theory
12. Weighted majority games
13. Stable matching algorithm
References
Index.