A Dialogue on Consciousness introduces readers to the debate about consciousness and physicalism, starting with its origins in Descartes, through a lively and entertaining dialogue between unemployed graduate students, who, secretly living in a university library, discuss major theories and quote passages from classic and contemporary texts in search of an answer.
A Dialogue on Consciousness introduces readers to the debate about consciousness and physicalism, starting with its origins in Descartes, through a lively and entertaining dialogue between unemployed graduate students, who, secretly living in a university library, discuss major theories and quote passages from classic and contemporary texts in search of an answer.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Monday Night Late Night in the Library The Subjectivity of Experience The Soul and the Mind Descartes' Conceivability Argument Lois Lane, Clark Kent, and Superman Arnauld's Objection to Descartes' Argument Hume's Elusive Self Souls and the Problem of Mental-Physical Causation Tuesday Night Computers and Cognition Consciousness versus Cognition Ignoring Subjectivity What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Need for a New Framework Mary and the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism Spectrum Inversion Zombies and the Conceivability Argument against Physicalism Wednesday Night The Structure of the Anti-Physicalist Arguments: The Epistemic Step and the Metaphysical Step Questioning the Epistemic Step Afterimages and Mary's Shortcuts to Phenomenal Knowledge The Importance of Deduction Psycho-Physical Laws Hooking Up to the Physical The Objectivity Condition on the Physical Deduction and Translation The Ability Hypothesis The Connection between Abilities and Information Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience Thursday Night Questioning the Metaphysical Step Superheroes and the Many Disguises of Physical Facts Disguise Depends on Ignorance The Cognitive Isolation of Phenomenal Concepts Martian Mary and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Do Phenomenal Concepts Require Experience? The Dilemma for the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Descartes Returns, with Zombies Friday Night Clarifying Property Dualism Why Souls Are No Help The Causal Inefficacy of Nonphysical Qualia Assessing the Costs of Epiphenomenalism The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment The Attractions of Monism Saturday Panpsychism Phenomenal Properties as the Ground of Physical Dispositions Panprotopsychism The Combination Problem The Problem of Mental-Physical Causation Redux The Significance of Ignorance Defining the Physical Subjective Physicalism Necessitation without Deduction The Sun Rises
Monday Night Late Night in the Library The Subjectivity of Experience The Soul and the Mind Descartes' Conceivability Argument Lois Lane, Clark Kent, and Superman Arnauld's Objection to Descartes' Argument Hume's Elusive Self Souls and the Problem of Mental-Physical Causation Tuesday Night Computers and Cognition Consciousness versus Cognition Ignoring Subjectivity What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Need for a New Framework Mary and the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism Spectrum Inversion Zombies and the Conceivability Argument against Physicalism Wednesday Night The Structure of the Anti-Physicalist Arguments: The Epistemic Step and the Metaphysical Step Questioning the Epistemic Step Afterimages and Mary's Shortcuts to Phenomenal Knowledge The Importance of Deduction Psycho-Physical Laws Hooking Up to the Physical The Objectivity Condition on the Physical Deduction and Translation The Ability Hypothesis The Connection between Abilities and Information Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience Thursday Night Questioning the Metaphysical Step Superheroes and the Many Disguises of Physical Facts Disguise Depends on Ignorance The Cognitive Isolation of Phenomenal Concepts Martian Mary and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Do Phenomenal Concepts Require Experience? The Dilemma for the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Descartes Returns, with Zombies Friday Night Clarifying Property Dualism Why Souls Are No Help The Causal Inefficacy of Nonphysical Qualia Assessing the Costs of Epiphenomenalism The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment The Attractions of Monism Saturday Panpsychism Phenomenal Properties as the Ground of Physical Dispositions Panprotopsychism The Combination Problem The Problem of Mental-Physical Causation Redux The Significance of Ignorance Defining the Physical Subjective Physicalism Necessitation without Deduction The Sun Rises
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