This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.
This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hilary Kornblith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the author of Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground (MIT, Press, 1993); Knowledge and its Place in Nature (OUP, 2002); and On Reflection (OUP 2012).
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments Introduction 1: Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory 2: Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action 3: How Internal Can You Get? 4: The Unattainability of Coherence 5: Epistemic Normativity 6: A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology 7: Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological 8: Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals 9: Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional? 10: Naturalism and Intuitions 11: A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping 12: Why Should We Care about the Concept of Knowledge? 13: Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy
Acknowledgments Introduction 1: Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory 2: Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action 3: How Internal Can You Get? 4: The Unattainability of Coherence 5: Epistemic Normativity 6: A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology 7: Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological 8: Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals 9: Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional? 10: Naturalism and Intuitions 11: A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping 12: Why Should We Care about the Concept of Knowledge? 13: Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy
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