Main description:
Market deregulation in Indian agriculture has been recently justified on the grounds that agricultural markets are competitive and efficient. This book explains why the assumption is incorrect and why deregulation may be dangerous both for efficiency and equity.
Table of contents:
Introduction
The Case for a Political Economy of Markets, Institutions and Policy Reform
Field Methods and Data
Agrarian Structure in Coimbatore District, South India
Exchange Relations and the Marketed Surplus
The Marketing Systems
Marketing Activity, Economic Power and Spatial Patterns
Capital and Money in the Market Systems
Labour and the Social Construction of Market Systems
Merchant's Land and Control of Production
State Regulation, Economic Crime and Bureaucratic Corruption
Accumulation and its Politics
Conclusion
Agricultural Markets of Coimbatore District
Market deregulation in Indian agriculture has been recently justified on the grounds that agricultural markets are competitive and efficient. This book explains why the assumption is incorrect and why deregulation may be dangerous both for efficiency and equity.
Table of contents:
Introduction
The Case for a Political Economy of Markets, Institutions and Policy Reform
Field Methods and Data
Agrarian Structure in Coimbatore District, South India
Exchange Relations and the Marketed Surplus
The Marketing Systems
Marketing Activity, Economic Power and Spatial Patterns
Capital and Money in the Market Systems
Labour and the Social Construction of Market Systems
Merchant's Land and Control of Production
State Regulation, Economic Crime and Bureaucratic Corruption
Accumulation and its Politics
Conclusion
Agricultural Markets of Coimbatore District