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Is Britain prepared to defend itself, or only to play a part in Armageddon? Examining recently released British government documents, this study presents a moral history of British defense policy. Roger Ruston analyzes government rationales for Britain's dependence on weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, arguing they are often essentially rationalizations for unstoppable political programs divorced from defense needs and morality.
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Is Britain prepared to defend itself, or only to play a part in Armageddon? Examining recently released British government documents, this study presents a moral history of British defense policy. Roger Ruston analyzes government rationales for Britain's dependence on weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, arguing they are often essentially rationalizations for unstoppable political programs divorced from defense needs and morality.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 282
- Erscheinungstermin: 28. September 1989
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 216mm x 140mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 508g
- ISBN-13: 9780198275657
- ISBN-10: 019827565X
- Artikelnr.: 21410998
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 282
- Erscheinungstermin: 28. September 1989
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 216mm x 140mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 508g
- ISBN-13: 9780198275657
- ISBN-10: 019827565X
- Artikelnr.: 21410998
former Lecturer in Ethics and Moral Theology at Blackfriars, Oxford.
Introduction
PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized?
Weapons, targets, and the law
New uses for an old theory
The rules of just war
Non-combatant immunity and its critics
LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers
Arms and security
Appeasement or Armegeddon?
The anti-Soviet element
LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory
The moral background
From 1939 to 1945: The practice
The official version
Reprisals in ethics and law
conclusions
PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon
The bomb is made and used
Labour inherits the bomb
Strategic priorities
The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence
The British bomb becomes a reality
The silence of the moralists
JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb
Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence
conclusions
DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957
Deterrence or defence?
A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution
Macmillan and the test ban
The question of strategy
The symbolic value of possession
Labour and unilateralism
Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used
Moral critique, 1957-1964
conclusions
POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence
Flexible response
Detente and 'The continuing threat'
American actions - British responsibilities
Would Polaris always get through?
conclusions
CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity
Long range theatre nuclear weapons
Replacing Polaris
The INF agreement
The new nuclear debate
conclusions
PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war
The question of limits
Two kinds of deterrence
The limit of limits
The control of nuclear war
conclusions
CONCLUSIONS.
PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized?
Weapons, targets, and the law
New uses for an old theory
The rules of just war
Non-combatant immunity and its critics
LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers
Arms and security
Appeasement or Armegeddon?
The anti-Soviet element
LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory
The moral background
From 1939 to 1945: The practice
The official version
Reprisals in ethics and law
conclusions
PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon
The bomb is made and used
Labour inherits the bomb
Strategic priorities
The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence
The British bomb becomes a reality
The silence of the moralists
JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb
Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence
conclusions
DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957
Deterrence or defence?
A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution
Macmillan and the test ban
The question of strategy
The symbolic value of possession
Labour and unilateralism
Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used
Moral critique, 1957-1964
conclusions
POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence
Flexible response
Detente and 'The continuing threat'
American actions - British responsibilities
Would Polaris always get through?
conclusions
CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity
Long range theatre nuclear weapons
Replacing Polaris
The INF agreement
The new nuclear debate
conclusions
PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war
The question of limits
Two kinds of deterrence
The limit of limits
The control of nuclear war
conclusions
CONCLUSIONS.
Introduction
PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized?
Weapons, targets, and the law
New uses for an old theory
The rules of just war
Non-combatant immunity and its critics
LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers
Arms and security
Appeasement or Armegeddon?
The anti-Soviet element
LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory
The moral background
From 1939 to 1945: The practice
The official version
Reprisals in ethics and law
conclusions
PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon
The bomb is made and used
Labour inherits the bomb
Strategic priorities
The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence
The British bomb becomes a reality
The silence of the moralists
JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb
Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence
conclusions
DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957
Deterrence or defence?
A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution
Macmillan and the test ban
The question of strategy
The symbolic value of possession
Labour and unilateralism
Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used
Moral critique, 1957-1964
conclusions
POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence
Flexible response
Detente and 'The continuing threat'
American actions - British responsibilities
Would Polaris always get through?
conclusions
CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity
Long range theatre nuclear weapons
Replacing Polaris
The INF agreement
The new nuclear debate
conclusions
PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war
The question of limits
Two kinds of deterrence
The limit of limits
The control of nuclear war
conclusions
CONCLUSIONS.
PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized?
Weapons, targets, and the law
New uses for an old theory
The rules of just war
Non-combatant immunity and its critics
LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers
Arms and security
Appeasement or Armegeddon?
The anti-Soviet element
LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory
The moral background
From 1939 to 1945: The practice
The official version
Reprisals in ethics and law
conclusions
PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon
The bomb is made and used
Labour inherits the bomb
Strategic priorities
The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence
The British bomb becomes a reality
The silence of the moralists
JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb
Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence
conclusions
DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957
Deterrence or defence?
A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution
Macmillan and the test ban
The question of strategy
The symbolic value of possession
Labour and unilateralism
Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used
Moral critique, 1957-1964
conclusions
POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence
Flexible response
Detente and 'The continuing threat'
American actions - British responsibilities
Would Polaris always get through?
conclusions
CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity
Long range theatre nuclear weapons
Replacing Polaris
The INF agreement
The new nuclear debate
conclusions
PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war
The question of limits
Two kinds of deterrence
The limit of limits
The control of nuclear war
conclusions
CONCLUSIONS.