This book presents a realist, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary theory of immediate awareness showing it is the most primitive cognitive network underlying all our natural intelligence. Including preattentive and attention processes, as well as primitive relations of the senses, imagination and memory, immediate awareness is a kind of knowing deeply embedded and interwoven throughout our multiple kinds of natural intelligence. It permits as well as drives our knowing how, our bodily intelligence. Against the Cartesian mind-body split found in earlier and current theories, the author…mehr
This book presents a realist, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary theory of immediate awareness showing it is the most primitive cognitive network underlying all our natural intelligence. Including preattentive and attention processes, as well as primitive relations of the senses, imagination and memory, immediate awareness is a kind of knowing deeply embedded and interwoven throughout our multiple kinds of natural intelligence. It permits as well as drives our knowing how, our bodily intelligence. Against the Cartesian mind-body split found in earlier and current theories, the author shows how immediate awareness permits emergent properties of mind in multilayered primitive relations of touching and moving in bodily kinesthetic intelligence. Contrary to existing theories, she argues that sensation is not cognitively 'neutral', nor does it require a 'representation' in order to be accessible to cognitive processes.
Dedication. Contents. List Of Figures. Preface. Acknowledgements. Introduction. 1: The Problem of Immediate Awareness. 1.1. The Influence of Nominalism, Idealism, and Behaviorism. 1.2. A Place for Ontological Questions. 1.3. Historical Background of the Problem: The Dualist Legacy of Descartes' Crooked Question. 1.4. From The Linguistic Turn to the Cognitive Naturalistic Turn. 1.5. The Knowing That and Knowing How Distinction: Manner of a Performance and Multiple Intelligences. 1.6. The Limits of Representation (Classification): The Role of Indexicals and Unique Objects Present. 1.7. Analyze This. 1.8. The Indexical Operator, Unlike Any Other: Sui Generis Objects. 1.9. The Basic Computational Idea and Argument. 2: The Primitive Relations of Knowledge by Acquaintance. 2.1. A Realist Theory of Immediate Awareness. 2.2. Analysis of Experience: Russell's Knowledge by Acquaintance. 2.3. Acquaintance with Mathematical Objects: Problems with Unnameables, Nameability and the Berry Paradox. 2.4. The Primitive Relations. 2.5. The Concept of Image. 2.6. Imagination and Sensation Defined. 2.7. Primitive Acquaintance with Relations Themselves. 2.8. Summary. 3: Arguments Against Immediate Awareness: The Case of Naturalism. 3.1. Definitions of Certain Terms. 3.2. Non-Inferential Beliefs: Self-Evident Beliefs and a Vox Populi Theory of Knowledge. 3.3. Indeterminacy of Translation and Other Problems. 3.4. Are There Immaculate Sensations? 3.5. Matching Up Stimulations. 3.6. Are Meaning Structures Equivalent to Neural Structures? STR
1. The Problem of Immediate Awareness.- 2. The Primitive Relations of Knowledge by Acquaintance.- 3. Arguments Against Immediate Awareness: The Case of Naturalism.- 4. What does the Evidence Show?.- 5. Boundary Set S: At the Core of Multiple Intelligences.- 6. Can Neural Networks Simulate Boundary Set S?.- 7. Computability of Boundary Set S.- 8. Summary and Conclusions.- References.
Dedication. Contents. List Of Figures. Preface. Acknowledgements. Introduction. 1: The Problem of Immediate Awareness. 1.1. The Influence of Nominalism, Idealism, and Behaviorism. 1.2. A Place for Ontological Questions. 1.3. Historical Background of the Problem: The Dualist Legacy of Descartes' Crooked Question. 1.4. From The Linguistic Turn to the Cognitive Naturalistic Turn. 1.5. The Knowing That and Knowing How Distinction: Manner of a Performance and Multiple Intelligences. 1.6. The Limits of Representation (Classification): The Role of Indexicals and Unique Objects Present. 1.7. Analyze This. 1.8. The Indexical Operator, Unlike Any Other: Sui Generis Objects. 1.9. The Basic Computational Idea and Argument. 2: The Primitive Relations of Knowledge by Acquaintance. 2.1. A Realist Theory of Immediate Awareness. 2.2. Analysis of Experience: Russell's Knowledge by Acquaintance. 2.3. Acquaintance with Mathematical Objects: Problems with Unnameables, Nameability and the Berry Paradox. 2.4. The Primitive Relations. 2.5. The Concept of Image. 2.6. Imagination and Sensation Defined. 2.7. Primitive Acquaintance with Relations Themselves. 2.8. Summary. 3: Arguments Against Immediate Awareness: The Case of Naturalism. 3.1. Definitions of Certain Terms. 3.2. Non-Inferential Beliefs: Self-Evident Beliefs and a Vox Populi Theory of Knowledge. 3.3. Indeterminacy of Translation and Other Problems. 3.4. Are There Immaculate Sensations? 3.5. Matching Up Stimulations. 3.6. Are Meaning Structures Equivalent to Neural Structures? STR
1. The Problem of Immediate Awareness.- 2. The Primitive Relations of Knowledge by Acquaintance.- 3. Arguments Against Immediate Awareness: The Case of Naturalism.- 4. What does the Evidence Show?.- 5. Boundary Set S: At the Core of Multiple Intelligences.- 6. Can Neural Networks Simulate Boundary Set S?.- 7. Computability of Boundary Set S.- 8. Summary and Conclusions.- References.
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