This book puts forward an original and sustained argument concerning the relations between law and obligation. Highlighting the conceptual connections of law and obligation, Bertea establishes a theory of legal obligation that engages with and offers critiques of commonly-held understandings in contemporary jurisprudence.
This book puts forward an original and sustained argument concerning the relations between law and obligation. Highlighting the conceptual connections of law and obligation, Bertea establishes a theory of legal obligation that engages with and offers critiques of commonly-held understandings in contemporary jurisprudence.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Stefano Bertea is a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft research fellow at the Goethe Universität and an Associate Professor at the University of Leicester. Previously, he was a Marie Sk¿odowska-Curie research fellow at the University of Edinburgh and at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, a visiting research fellow at the Am Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Germany, an Alexander von Humboldt research fellow at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, a senior research fellow at the Universiteit Antwerpen, a visiting professor at the Università degli Studi di Verona and at the Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, and a visiting researcher at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1. The concept of obligation 2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map 3. The social-practice account 4. The interpretivist account 5. The conventionalist reason account 6. The exclusionary reason account 7. A revisionary Kantian conception 8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception 9. The robust reason account 10. The method of presuppositional interpretation Conclusion.
Introduction 1. The concept of obligation 2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map 3. The social-practice account 4. The interpretivist account 5. The conventionalist reason account 6. The exclusionary reason account 7. A revisionary Kantian conception 8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception 9. The robust reason account 10. The method of presuppositional interpretation Conclusion.
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