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Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have once again rekindled the debate about the viability of the aerial FAC. The bottom line is that the FAC(A) is an essential combat multiplier for ground component commanders. The mission, regardless of platform or service, is designed to extend the operational reach of the tactical air control party and ground-based FACs resulting in better air-ground integration. The fact that the mission is performed by an aerial platform only increases flexibility and applicability. Effective employment and utilization of the TACP, FACs, and FAC(A)s ensures air power remains a viable combat multiplier at the forefront of ground commander's minds. Ironically, FAC(A)s are being vastly underutilized in these two current conflicts.