In re-examining the concepts of desire, intention, and trying, David K. Chan brings a fresh approach toward resolving many of the problems that have occupied philosophers of action for almost a century. This book not only presents a complete theory of human agency but also, by developing the conceptual tools needed to do moral philosophy, lays the groundwork for formulating an ethics that is rooted in a clear, intuitive, and coherent moral psychology.
In re-examining the concepts of desire, intention, and trying, David K. Chan brings a fresh approach toward resolving many of the problems that have occupied philosophers of action for almost a century. This book not only presents a complete theory of human agency but also, by developing the conceptual tools needed to do moral philosophy, lays the groundwork for formulating an ethics that is rooted in a clear, intuitive, and coherent moral psychology.
Preface Introduction The Need to Reconceptualize Action What Needs to be Reconceptualized Putting the Pieces Together Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Action Philosophy of Action Causal and Non-Causal Theories Conceptualizing Action 'Actopia' Evaluating Action Fixing the Constants An Outline of this Book Chapter 2: Intention Skepticism about Intention The Planning Theory of Intention Intention and Reasons for Acting Comparing Concepts of Intention Chapter 3: Desire Defining Desire Extrinsic Desire Desire Ownership Motivation, Reason, and Akratic Agency Chapter 4: From Volitions to Tryings Volitions and the Regress Problem Why Do Volitionalists Say Strange Things? A Theory of Tryings The Identity-Theory of Trying as Mental and Physical Mental Tryings The Theoretical Advantage of Conceptualizing Tryings as Processes Non-Observational Knowledge of Trying Chapter 5: Problems and Issues in Action Theory Deviant Causality The Simple View Non-Intentional Actions Basic and Non-Basic Actions The Nature of Action Desiring and Intending to Try Chapter 6: Rational and Moral Agency The Doctrine of Double Effect The Moral Significance of Non-Intentional Agency The Argument Against Ethical Rationalism Conclusion The Reconceptualized Action Theory The Importance of Getting It Right Bibliography Index
Preface Introduction The Need to Reconceptualize Action What Needs to be Reconceptualized Putting the Pieces Together Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Action Philosophy of Action Causal and Non-Causal Theories Conceptualizing Action 'Actopia' Evaluating Action Fixing the Constants An Outline of this Book Chapter 2: Intention Skepticism about Intention The Planning Theory of Intention Intention and Reasons for Acting Comparing Concepts of Intention Chapter 3: Desire Defining Desire Extrinsic Desire Desire Ownership Motivation, Reason, and Akratic Agency Chapter 4: From Volitions to Tryings Volitions and the Regress Problem Why Do Volitionalists Say Strange Things? A Theory of Tryings The Identity-Theory of Trying as Mental and Physical Mental Tryings The Theoretical Advantage of Conceptualizing Tryings as Processes Non-Observational Knowledge of Trying Chapter 5: Problems and Issues in Action Theory Deviant Causality The Simple View Non-Intentional Actions Basic and Non-Basic Actions The Nature of Action Desiring and Intending to Try Chapter 6: Rational and Moral Agency The Doctrine of Double Effect The Moral Significance of Non-Intentional Agency The Argument Against Ethical Rationalism Conclusion The Reconceptualized Action Theory The Importance of Getting It Right Bibliography Index
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