The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours. This fascinating new book addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action
The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours. This fascinating new book addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible actionHinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Lubomira Radoilska's research has focused on developing a new theory of autonomous agency and exploring its implications in core areas of philosophy. She holds a doctorate in philosophy from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. Since 2003, she has held the following positions at the University of Cambridge: Research Fellow at Clare Hall, Director of Studies at New Hall and Downing College, and Wellcome Trust Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy, where she is currently an Affiliated Lecturer. Since September 2003, she also holds a Lectureship in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury. Lubomira Radoilska is the author of 'Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of Today' (PUF, 2007) and editor of 'Autonomy and Mental Disorder' (OUP, 2012).
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction: The Moral Philosophy of Addiction and Weakness of Will 1: Addiction and Voluntary Control 1.1: Wallace on Responsibility and Control 1.2: The Disparity of Actions and Attitudes 1.3: Responsibility for Addiction: Excuses and Exemptions 1.4: Actions and Omissions Revisited 1.5: Positive Moral Appraisal 2: Addiction and Rational Judgement 2.1: Smith on Responsibility for Attitudes 2.2: Responsible Irrationality 2.2.1: Conflicting Attitudes 2.2.2: Implications for Paradigm Cases: Patterns of Awareness and Wholehearted Attitudes 2.3: Is Responsibility Best Understood as a Cluster Concept? 2.4: Addiction and Agential Evaluative Stance 2.4.1: De Quincey: Confessions of an English Opium Eater 2.4.2: Dostoevsky: The Gambler 3: Weakness of Will and Moral Appraisal 3.1: Arplay on Responsibility in the Absence of Control 3.2: Standard Akrasia 3.3: Inverse Akrasia 3.3.1: Inept Burglar 3.3.2: Neoptolemus 3.3.3: Huckleberry Finn 3.4: Strength Versus Goodness of Will 3.4.1: Mizogushi 4: Before Weakness of Will 4.1: Holton on Weakness of Will 4.2: Aristotle on Akrasia 4.2.1: The Logical Form of Akrasia 4.2.2: The Blameworthiness of Akrasia 4.2.3: The Pre-Intentionality of Akrasia 4.3: Revisting Weakness of Will 4.4: Weakness of Will as a Failure to Resist Akrasia 5: Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account 5.1: Actions as Actualization 5.2: Success in Action and the Guise of the Good 5.3: Less than Successful Actions 5.4: Concluding Remarks:The Offspring of Akrasia
Introduction: The Moral Philosophy of Addiction and Weakness of Will 1: Addiction and Voluntary Control 1.1: Wallace on Responsibility and Control 1.2: The Disparity of Actions and Attitudes 1.3: Responsibility for Addiction: Excuses and Exemptions 1.4: Actions and Omissions Revisited 1.5: Positive Moral Appraisal 2: Addiction and Rational Judgement 2.1: Smith on Responsibility for Attitudes 2.2: Responsible Irrationality 2.2.1: Conflicting Attitudes 2.2.2: Implications for Paradigm Cases: Patterns of Awareness and Wholehearted Attitudes 2.3: Is Responsibility Best Understood as a Cluster Concept? 2.4: Addiction and Agential Evaluative Stance 2.4.1: De Quincey: Confessions of an English Opium Eater 2.4.2: Dostoevsky: The Gambler 3: Weakness of Will and Moral Appraisal 3.1: Arplay on Responsibility in the Absence of Control 3.2: Standard Akrasia 3.3: Inverse Akrasia 3.3.1: Inept Burglar 3.3.2: Neoptolemus 3.3.3: Huckleberry Finn 3.4: Strength Versus Goodness of Will 3.4.1: Mizogushi 4: Before Weakness of Will 4.1: Holton on Weakness of Will 4.2: Aristotle on Akrasia 4.2.1: The Logical Form of Akrasia 4.2.2: The Blameworthiness of Akrasia 4.2.3: The Pre-Intentionality of Akrasia 4.3: Revisting Weakness of Will 4.4: Weakness of Will as a Failure to Resist Akrasia 5: Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account 5.1: Actions as Actualization 5.2: Success in Action and the Guise of the Good 5.3: Less than Successful Actions 5.4: Concluding Remarks:The Offspring of Akrasia
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