Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.
Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.
Richard Kraut was educated at the University of Michigan and Princeton University. He has taught in the Philosophy Departments at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Northwestern University, where he is Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor in the Humanities.
Inhaltsangabe
Contents Acknowledgments 1. Moore and the Idea of Goodness 2. Goodness Before and After Moore 3. An Argument for Absolute Goodness 4. Absolute Evil, Relative Goodness 5. Recent Skepticism about Goodness 6. Being Good and Being Good for Someone 7. Non-Instrumental Advantageousness 8. The Problem of Intelligibility 9. The Problem of Double Value 10. Pleasure Reconsidered 11. Scanlon's Buck-Passing Account of Value 12. Moore's Argument Against Relative Goodness 13. Goodness and Variability 14. Impersonality: an Ethical Objection to Absolute Goodness 15. Further Reflections on the Ethical Objection 16. Moore's Mistake About Unobserved Beauty 17. Better States of Affairs and Buck-Passing 18. The Enjoyment of Beauty 19. Is Love Absolutely Good? 20. Is Cruelty Absolutely Bad? 21. Kant on Suicide 22. Future Generations 23. Bio-Diversity 24. Is Equality Absolutely Good? 25. The Value of Persons and Other Creatures 26. Euthanasia 27. The Extinction of Humankind 28. The Case Against Absolute Goodness Reviewed 29. The Problem of Intelligibility Revisited 30. Attributive and Predicative Uses of "Good " Appendix A: Killing Persons Appendix B: J. David Velleman on the Value Inhering in Persons Appendix C: Robert Merrihew Adams on the Highest Good Appendix D: Thomas Hurka on the Structure of Goods Appendix E: Jeff McMahan on Impersonal Value Appendix F: Other Authors and Uses 1. Plato 2. Aristotle 3. John Rawls 4. John Broome Bibliography
Contents Acknowledgments 1. Moore and the Idea of Goodness 2. Goodness Before and After Moore 3. An Argument for Absolute Goodness 4. Absolute Evil, Relative Goodness 5. Recent Skepticism about Goodness 6. Being Good and Being Good for Someone 7. Non-Instrumental Advantageousness 8. The Problem of Intelligibility 9. The Problem of Double Value 10. Pleasure Reconsidered 11. Scanlon's Buck-Passing Account of Value 12. Moore's Argument Against Relative Goodness 13. Goodness and Variability 14. Impersonality: an Ethical Objection to Absolute Goodness 15. Further Reflections on the Ethical Objection 16. Moore's Mistake About Unobserved Beauty 17. Better States of Affairs and Buck-Passing 18. The Enjoyment of Beauty 19. Is Love Absolutely Good? 20. Is Cruelty Absolutely Bad? 21. Kant on Suicide 22. Future Generations 23. Bio-Diversity 24. Is Equality Absolutely Good? 25. The Value of Persons and Other Creatures 26. Euthanasia 27. The Extinction of Humankind 28. The Case Against Absolute Goodness Reviewed 29. The Problem of Intelligibility Revisited 30. Attributive and Predicative Uses of "Good " Appendix A: Killing Persons Appendix B: J. David Velleman on the Value Inhering in Persons Appendix C: Robert Merrihew Adams on the Highest Good Appendix D: Thomas Hurka on the Structure of Goods Appendix E: Jeff McMahan on Impersonal Value Appendix F: Other Authors and Uses 1. Plato 2. Aristotle 3. John Rawls 4. John Broome Bibliography
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