The puzzle that motivates Agency and Joint Attention is how people are able at one and the same time to maintain their own sense of autonomy, taking responsibility for their own actions and distinguishing them from the actions of others, while still being able to understand, appreciate, and coordinate their thoughts and actions with other people.
The puzzle that motivates Agency and Joint Attention is how people are able at one and the same time to maintain their own sense of autonomy, taking responsibility for their own actions and distinguishing them from the actions of others, while still being able to understand, appreciate, and coordinate their thoughts and actions with other people.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Janet Metcalfe, Betsy Sparrow and Herb TerraceAll at Department of Psychology, Columbia University
Inhaltsangabe
* Contributors * Introduction * Herbert Terrace * Chapter 1 * Becoming Human: Why Two Minds are Better Than One * Herbert S. Terrace * Chapter 2 * How Joint Is The Joint Attention Of Apes And Human Infants? * Malinda Carpenter and Josep Call * Chapter 3 * The Comparative Delusion: The 'Behavioristic'/ 'Mentalistic' Dichotomy in Comparative Theory Of Mind Research * Derek C. Penn and Daniel J. Povinelli * Chapter 4 * Behavior-Reading Versus Mentalizing In Animals * Logan Fletcher and Peter Carruthers * Chapter 5 * On Knowing and Being Known in the 4-Month Origins of Disorganized Attachment: An Emerging Presymbolic Theory Of Mind * Beatrice Beebe, Sara Markese, Lorraine Bahrick, Frank Lachmann, Karen Buck, * Henian Chen, Patricia Cohen, Howard Andrews, and Joseph Jaffe * Chapter 6 * Gaze Following And Agency In Human Infancy * Andrew N. Meltzoff and Rechele Brooks * Chapter 7 * Ostensive Communication and Cultural Learning: The Natural Pedagogy Hypothesis * György Gergely * Chapter 8 * Embodied Attention in Infant Pointing * Fabia Franco * Chapter 9 * Understanding the Structure of Communicative Interactions in Infancy * Athena Vouloumanos and Kristine H. Onishi * Chapter 10 * Cognition in Action: A New Look at the Cortical Motor System * Vittorio Gallese and Corrado Sinigaglia * Chapter 10 * Early Sensitivity to Emotion Cues - Precursors of Social Referencing? * Stefanie Hoehl * Chapter 11 * Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action * Anne Böckler and Natalie Sebanz * Chapter 12 * Do You See What I See? The Neural Bases of Joint Attention * Elizabeth Redcay and Rebecca Saxe * Chapter 12 * Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action * Anne Böckler and Natalie Sebanz * Chapter 14 * 'Knowing' That the Self is the Agent * Janet Metcalfe * Chapter 15 * Cues To Agency: Time Can Tell * Robrecht Van Der Wel and Günther Knoblich * Chapter 16 * The Meaning of Actions: Crosstalk between Procedural and Declarative Action Knowledge * Wolfgang Prinz, Christiane Diefenbach, and Anne Springer * Chapter 17 * The Three Pillars of Volition: Phenomenal States, Ideomotor Processing, and The Skeletal Muscle System * Ezequiel Morsella Tanaz Molapour, and Margaret T. Lynn * Chapter 18 * The Function of Consciousness in Controlling Behavior * Sara Steele and Hakwan Lau * Chapter 19 * Sense of Agency: Many Facets, Multiple Sources * Elisabeth Pacherie
* Contributors * Introduction * Herbert Terrace * Chapter 1 * Becoming Human: Why Two Minds are Better Than One * Herbert S. Terrace * Chapter 2 * How Joint Is The Joint Attention Of Apes And Human Infants? * Malinda Carpenter and Josep Call * Chapter 3 * The Comparative Delusion: The 'Behavioristic'/ 'Mentalistic' Dichotomy in Comparative Theory Of Mind Research * Derek C. Penn and Daniel J. Povinelli * Chapter 4 * Behavior-Reading Versus Mentalizing In Animals * Logan Fletcher and Peter Carruthers * Chapter 5 * On Knowing and Being Known in the 4-Month Origins of Disorganized Attachment: An Emerging Presymbolic Theory Of Mind * Beatrice Beebe, Sara Markese, Lorraine Bahrick, Frank Lachmann, Karen Buck, * Henian Chen, Patricia Cohen, Howard Andrews, and Joseph Jaffe * Chapter 6 * Gaze Following And Agency In Human Infancy * Andrew N. Meltzoff and Rechele Brooks * Chapter 7 * Ostensive Communication and Cultural Learning: The Natural Pedagogy Hypothesis * György Gergely * Chapter 8 * Embodied Attention in Infant Pointing * Fabia Franco * Chapter 9 * Understanding the Structure of Communicative Interactions in Infancy * Athena Vouloumanos and Kristine H. Onishi * Chapter 10 * Cognition in Action: A New Look at the Cortical Motor System * Vittorio Gallese and Corrado Sinigaglia * Chapter 10 * Early Sensitivity to Emotion Cues - Precursors of Social Referencing? * Stefanie Hoehl * Chapter 11 * Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action * Anne Böckler and Natalie Sebanz * Chapter 12 * Do You See What I See? The Neural Bases of Joint Attention * Elizabeth Redcay and Rebecca Saxe * Chapter 12 * Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action * Anne Böckler and Natalie Sebanz * Chapter 14 * 'Knowing' That the Self is the Agent * Janet Metcalfe * Chapter 15 * Cues To Agency: Time Can Tell * Robrecht Van Der Wel and Günther Knoblich * Chapter 16 * The Meaning of Actions: Crosstalk between Procedural and Declarative Action Knowledge * Wolfgang Prinz, Christiane Diefenbach, and Anne Springer * Chapter 17 * The Three Pillars of Volition: Phenomenal States, Ideomotor Processing, and The Skeletal Muscle System * Ezequiel Morsella Tanaz Molapour, and Margaret T. Lynn * Chapter 18 * The Function of Consciousness in Controlling Behavior * Sara Steele and Hakwan Lau * Chapter 19 * Sense of Agency: Many Facets, Multiple Sources * Elisabeth Pacherie
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