Paul Katsafanas explores how we can justify normative claims such as 'murder is wrong'. He defends an original account of constitutivism--the view that we do so by showing that agents become committed to them in virtue of acting--and resolves philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims.
Paul Katsafanas explores how we can justify normative claims such as 'murder is wrong'. He defends an original account of constitutivism--the view that we do so by showing that agents become committed to them in virtue of acting--and resolves philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims.
Paul Katsafanas is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. He works in ethics, action theory, and nineteenth-century philosophy.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1: Three Challenges for Ethical Theory 2: Normativity as Inescapability 3: Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge 4: Constitutivism and Self-Constitution 5: Action's First Constitutive Aim: Agential Activity 6: Action's Second Constitutive Aim: Power 7: The Structure of Nietzschean Constitutivism 8: The Normative Results Generated by Nietzschean Constitutivism 9: Activity, Power, and the Foundations of Ethics Appendix: Is Nietzsche Really a Constitutivist? References
Introduction 1: Three Challenges for Ethical Theory 2: Normativity as Inescapability 3: Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge 4: Constitutivism and Self-Constitution 5: Action's First Constitutive Aim: Agential Activity 6: Action's Second Constitutive Aim: Power 7: The Structure of Nietzschean Constitutivism 8: The Normative Results Generated by Nietzschean Constitutivism 9: Activity, Power, and the Foundations of Ethics Appendix: Is Nietzsche Really a Constitutivist? References
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