Philosophers and psychologists often talk about the moral distance we put between the self we are trying to be and the emotions we still sometimes have. Tumulty instead argues that there can be a similar moral distance between the self you want to be and the experiences you have. She explains what drives discomfort with our patterns of perception and sensation. She argues that philosophers should not assume experience is too passive to generate this kind of discomfort with ourselves, and it suggests ways for coping with this discomfort when it occurs.
Philosophers and psychologists often talk about the moral distance we put between the self we are trying to be and the emotions we still sometimes have. Tumulty instead argues that there can be a similar moral distance between the self you want to be and the experiences you have. She explains what drives discomfort with our patterns of perception and sensation. She argues that philosophers should not assume experience is too passive to generate this kind of discomfort with ourselves, and it suggests ways for coping with this discomfort when it occurs.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Maura Tumulty is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Colgate University. She received her PhD from the University of Pittsburgh, her MSc from the University of Edinburgh, and her BA from Williams College. She is interested in questions at the intersection of philosophy of mind and moral psychology.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgements Introduction Chapter 1: Alien Experience Section 1: Agency in attitudes-and experience? Section 2: A sketch of alienated experience Section 3: How could such endorsement or rejection be significant? Section 4: Ways an agent can reject an experience Section 5: Consequences and concerns Chapter 2: Self-Control Section 1: Judgment sensitivity Section 2: Managerial self-control Section 3: Distinctively first-personal managerial self-control Section 4: Imagination and instrumental reasons Section 5: Alienable experiences Section 6: Will-power and obsession Chapter 3: The Forensic Approach to Experience Section 1: Alienation and false belief Section 2: The forensic approach to experience Section 3: A bit more about cognitive penetration Section 4: What if the IAT research program is built on sand? Section 5: Are we presupposing an ideal experience? Chapter 4: Paths to Alienation Section 1: Food, fit, fallacy Section 2: Experiencing buildings Section 3: Traces of atrocity Section 4: Responding to troubling invitations Chapter 5: Consequences for Philosophy of Perception Section 1: Naïve realism Section 2: Hallucination and illusion Section 3: Denying high-level properties Section 4: The need for representation Section 5: Wishful seeing
Acknowledgements Introduction Chapter 1: Alien Experience Section 1: Agency in attitudes-and experience? Section 2: A sketch of alienated experience Section 3: How could such endorsement or rejection be significant? Section 4: Ways an agent can reject an experience Section 5: Consequences and concerns Chapter 2: Self-Control Section 1: Judgment sensitivity Section 2: Managerial self-control Section 3: Distinctively first-personal managerial self-control Section 4: Imagination and instrumental reasons Section 5: Alienable experiences Section 6: Will-power and obsession Chapter 3: The Forensic Approach to Experience Section 1: Alienation and false belief Section 2: The forensic approach to experience Section 3: A bit more about cognitive penetration Section 4: What if the IAT research program is built on sand? Section 5: Are we presupposing an ideal experience? Chapter 4: Paths to Alienation Section 1: Food, fit, fallacy Section 2: Experiencing buildings Section 3: Traces of atrocity Section 4: Responding to troubling invitations Chapter 5: Consequences for Philosophy of Perception Section 1: Naïve realism Section 2: Hallucination and illusion Section 3: Denying high-level properties Section 4: The need for representation Section 5: Wishful seeing
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