The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each chapter.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each chapter.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
an excellent book. This is a major contribution to the literature in the area of information economics. The most important quality of the book is that it is relatively easy to understand the complicated models of information economics from this book. It is a useful book for all academics interested in modern economics and business issues Prof. Sardar M. N. Islam, Victoria University, Australia