In this collection of essays, I endeavour to found a novel stance concerning the relationship between Subjectively experienced consciousness and objectively observable occurrences in the CNS ( consciousness-brain problem). Although, from antiquity up to the fashionable though in my eyes highly dubious neurophilosophical approaches of our days, this problem has found innumerable answers, most of them and, as far as I can see, all of them that are presently being discussed by mainstream philosophers and empirical scientists may be roughly subsumed under the well-known generic labels of either dualism or monism (or hybrids of them). Objecting simultaneously to both of these overall positions all variants of which, I think, may gain whatever little appearance of acceptability they have at all mainly in the light of the shortcomings of their respective opposites , I am going to suggest trying out a third way beyond monism and dualism, which I propose to call complementaristic in much the sense of Niels Bohr s. This requires a fundamental reassessment of some of our most deeply ingrained and practically never challenged preconceptions in the philosophy of mind.
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