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Early in 1966, with American bombing efforts in Viet Nam achieving limited affect in stemming the flow of support to communist forces in the south, the U.S. defense establishment began casting about for alternatives. By late summer this research had crystallized into a plan for a "barrier" that stretched from the Gulf of Tonkin into Laos across the 17 th parallel. Comprised of both physical and electronic components, the idea caught the eye of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara who established a Joint Task Force to implement the program. Given one year to have a system in place, the…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
Early in 1966, with American bombing efforts in Viet Nam achieving limited affect in stemming the flow of support to communist forces in the south, the U.S. defense establishment began casting about for alternatives. By late summer this research had crystallized into a plan for a "barrier" that stretched from the Gulf of Tonkin into Laos across the 17 th parallel. Comprised of both physical and electronic components, the idea caught the eye of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara who established a Joint Task Force to implement the program. Given one year to have a system in place, the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) pulled out all the stops to bring the program to fruition. Gradually shifting emphasis from the physical barrier in the DMZ region to the electronic system further west, DCPG oversaw all phases of the program from Washington, D.C. to Eglin AFB, to Panama to Southeast Asia. A detailed examination of the successes and failures of DCPG and by extension the barrier system was conducted utilizing all facets of the historical record.