How can we explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? This book investigates Aristotle's views on these and related questions.
How can we explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? This book investigates Aristotle's views on these and related questions.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Anna Marmodoro is a Fellow in Philosophy of Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford. She specializes in ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics, and currently directs a major research project in metaphysics funded by the European Research Council.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgements Introduction Chapter 1 - The metaphysical foundations of perception Introduction 1.1 Aristotle's power ontology 1.2 The nature of causal powers 1.3 Causal powers in actuality 1.4 Relations and relatives 1.5 Causation without glue 1.6 The causal powers model in Physics III 3 Concluding remarks Chapter 2- Aristotle's causal powers theory of perception Introduction 2.1 The faculty of perception 2.2 The five senses 2.3 The power(s) to cause perceptual experiences 2.4 Aristotle's causal powers theory of perception 2.5 Alternative interpretations of De Anima III 2 Concluding remarks Appendix: How do the senses 'take on' perceptible qualities? Chapter 3 - Aristotle's subtle perceptual realism Introduction 3.1 Perceptible qualities in second actuality 3.1.1 The single-track powers view 3.1.2 The multi-track and multi-stage powers view 3.2 Objectivity of content and subjectivity of experience 3.2.1 Aristotle's Subtle Perceptual Realism 3.2.2 Aristotle and McDowell 3.3 The role of the medium in perception Concluding remarks Chapter 4 - The problem of complex perceptual content Introduction 4.1 The common sense and the perception of complex perceptual content 4.2 Simultaneous perception 4.3 Incidental perception 4.4 Perception of the common sensibles 4.5 From the perception of the common sensibles to the perception of objects Concluding remarks Appendix: Varieties of incidental perception Chapter 5 - Unity of subject, operation, content, and time Introduction 5.1 Physical constraints on complex perceptual content 5.2 The unity of subject, of operation and of time 5.3 No duplication of perceptual awareness 5.4 A 'robust' interpretation of the common sense 5.5 A new individuation principle for the common sense Concluding remarks Chapter 6 - Mixing the many and partitioning the one Introduction 6. 1 The Mixed Contents Model 6.2 The Multiple Sensors Model 6.3 The Ratio Model Concluding remarks Chapter 7 - One and many perceptual faculties Introduction 7.1 The Relative Identity Model 7.2 The Substance Model 7.3 The Common Power Model Concluding remarks Chapter 8 - Conclusions Bibliography
Acknowledgements Introduction Chapter 1 - The metaphysical foundations of perception Introduction 1.1 Aristotle's power ontology 1.2 The nature of causal powers 1.3 Causal powers in actuality 1.4 Relations and relatives 1.5 Causation without glue 1.6 The causal powers model in Physics III 3 Concluding remarks Chapter 2- Aristotle's causal powers theory of perception Introduction 2.1 The faculty of perception 2.2 The five senses 2.3 The power(s) to cause perceptual experiences 2.4 Aristotle's causal powers theory of perception 2.5 Alternative interpretations of De Anima III 2 Concluding remarks Appendix: How do the senses 'take on' perceptible qualities? Chapter 3 - Aristotle's subtle perceptual realism Introduction 3.1 Perceptible qualities in second actuality 3.1.1 The single-track powers view 3.1.2 The multi-track and multi-stage powers view 3.2 Objectivity of content and subjectivity of experience 3.2.1 Aristotle's Subtle Perceptual Realism 3.2.2 Aristotle and McDowell 3.3 The role of the medium in perception Concluding remarks Chapter 4 - The problem of complex perceptual content Introduction 4.1 The common sense and the perception of complex perceptual content 4.2 Simultaneous perception 4.3 Incidental perception 4.4 Perception of the common sensibles 4.5 From the perception of the common sensibles to the perception of objects Concluding remarks Appendix: Varieties of incidental perception Chapter 5 - Unity of subject, operation, content, and time Introduction 5.1 Physical constraints on complex perceptual content 5.2 The unity of subject, of operation and of time 5.3 No duplication of perceptual awareness 5.4 A 'robust' interpretation of the common sense 5.5 A new individuation principle for the common sense Concluding remarks Chapter 6 - Mixing the many and partitioning the one Introduction 6. 1 The Mixed Contents Model 6.2 The Multiple Sensors Model 6.3 The Ratio Model Concluding remarks Chapter 7 - One and many perceptual faculties Introduction 7.1 The Relative Identity Model 7.2 The Substance Model 7.3 The Common Power Model Concluding remarks Chapter 8 - Conclusions Bibliography
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