Army Attack Aviation and Joint Air Integration
Doctrinal and Institutional Barriers
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Less than ten years after opening the Gulf War Air campaign, Army Attack Aviation was propelled into the spotlight over a perceived failure to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization air operations in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Since political constraints precluded a ground option to resolve the conflict, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe requested a wide range of aerospace assets to accomplish campaign objectives. When adverse weather impacted fixed-wing operations, Army Attack Aviation under the command structure of Task Force Hawk was deployed to Albania to answer the shortfa...
Less than ten years after opening the Gulf War Air campaign, Army Attack Aviation was propelled into the spotlight over a perceived failure to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization air operations in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Since political constraints precluded a ground option to resolve the conflict, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe requested a wide range of aerospace assets to accomplish campaign objectives. When adverse weather impacted fixed-wing operations, Army Attack Aviation under the command structure of Task Force Hawk was deployed to Albania to answer the shortfall. Operation ALLIED FORCE ceased air operations without ever committing Task Force Hawk on 24 June 1999, when Serbian President Milosevic agreed to withdraw all Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo. Although Task Force Hawk was never employed in air strikes in Kosovo, the Air War Over Serbia in March -June 1999 highlighted some underlying doctrinal and institutional barriers to integrating Army Attack Aviation into joint air operations. Doctrinally, the United States Army was ill-prepared to operate Army Attack Aviation as an air weapon. There were no doctrinal constructs to integrate Corps staffs at the operational level. Absence of an official command relationship between the Combined Forces Air Component Commander and the Task Force Hawk Commander further exasperated the integration of Army Attack Aviation into Joint Air Operations. The battlefield framework of deep, close, and rear operations was not applicable to the combined air operations environment in the Air War Over Serbia. Instead, the Joint Air Doctrine environment conducts operations based on air mission elements like Strategic Attack, Air Interdiction and Close Air Support. Institutionally, mistrust between USA and Joint Air Operations leadership and planners, lack of understanding of integration requirements, fear of loss of control of Army Aviation, and training constructs adversely impacted the int
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