Why comply with international law when there is no world government to enforce it? Jens David Ohlin provides an alternate vision of international law based on a truly innovative theory of human rationality. Rationality requires that agents follow through on their plans even when faced with opportunities for defection.
Why comply with international law when there is no world government to enforce it? Jens David Ohlin provides an alternate vision of international law based on a truly innovative theory of human rationality. Rationality requires that agents follow through on their plans even when faced with opportunities for defection.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; co-author of Defending Humanity (OUP) and co-editor of Targeted Killings (OUP)
Inhaltsangabe
PROLOGUE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE 1. The Office of Legal Counsel 2. The Emergence of the New Realists 3. Conclusion CHAPTER ONE: GAMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 1. The Erie Doctrine 2.0 2. The Filartiga Era: Enforcing International Law at Home 3. Filartiga's Demise, Parochialism's Rise 4. The New Realists go to Washington 5. International Law as Interpretive Guidance 6. Conclusion CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS AND LEVIATHANS 1. Public Opinion and Law 2. Presidential Power: The New Realist's Normative Argument 3. Democratic Decision-making versus Schmittology 4. Executive Action During Emergencies 5. Why Schmittian Administrative Law is Not Inevitable 6. Conclusion CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTACK: MISUNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY 1. The Game Theory Game 2. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium 3. Law and Self-Interest 4. Objections to the Moral Obligation of States CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. The Toxin Puzzle and Taking the Long View 2. The Deterrence Paradox and the Limits of Follow-Through 3. Assurances and Cooperation 4. Why the New Realists Fail to Understand Rationality 5. Rationality and Obligation CHAPTER FIVE: WAR AS COOPERATION 1. War as Cooperation 2. Who can be Targeted? Combatants, Civilians, and CCFers 3. Geographical Constraints on Armed Conflict 4. Co-Applying the Laws of War with Human Rights CHAPTER 6: REENGAGING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1. Global Legalism vs. Rational Choice: A False Dichotomy 2. Does Globalization Need Taming? 3. The United Nations 4. The International Court of Justice 5. The International Criminal Court
PROLOGUE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE 1. The Office of Legal Counsel 2. The Emergence of the New Realists 3. Conclusion CHAPTER ONE: GAMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 1. The Erie Doctrine 2.0 2. The Filartiga Era: Enforcing International Law at Home 3. Filartiga's Demise, Parochialism's Rise 4. The New Realists go to Washington 5. International Law as Interpretive Guidance 6. Conclusion CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS AND LEVIATHANS 1. Public Opinion and Law 2. Presidential Power: The New Realist's Normative Argument 3. Democratic Decision-making versus Schmittology 4. Executive Action During Emergencies 5. Why Schmittian Administrative Law is Not Inevitable 6. Conclusion CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTACK: MISUNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY 1. The Game Theory Game 2. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium 3. Law and Self-Interest 4. Objections to the Moral Obligation of States CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. The Toxin Puzzle and Taking the Long View 2. The Deterrence Paradox and the Limits of Follow-Through 3. Assurances and Cooperation 4. Why the New Realists Fail to Understand Rationality 5. Rationality and Obligation CHAPTER FIVE: WAR AS COOPERATION 1. War as Cooperation 2. Who can be Targeted? Combatants, Civilians, and CCFers 3. Geographical Constraints on Armed Conflict 4. Co-Applying the Laws of War with Human Rights CHAPTER 6: REENGAGING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1. Global Legalism vs. Rational Choice: A False Dichotomy 2. Does Globalization Need Taming? 3. The United Nations 4. The International Court of Justice 5. The International Criminal Court
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