This book extrapolates on the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Acknowledgments 1. Preliminaries 2. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a fixed number of agents 3. Population monotonicity and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 4. Population monotonicity and the egalitarian solution 5. Truncated egalitarian and monotone path solutions 6. Guarantees and opportunities 7. Stability and the Nash solution 8. Stability without pareto-optimality 9. Stability and the leximin solution 10. Population monotonicity, weak stability and the egalitarian solution 11. Stability and collectively rational solutions 12. Invariance under replication and juxtaposition Bibliography Index.
Acknowledgments 1. Preliminaries 2. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a fixed number of agents 3. Population monotonicity and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 4. Population monotonicity and the egalitarian solution 5. Truncated egalitarian and monotone path solutions 6. Guarantees and opportunities 7. Stability and the Nash solution 8. Stability without pareto-optimality 9. Stability and the leximin solution 10. Population monotonicity, weak stability and the egalitarian solution 11. Stability and collectively rational solutions 12. Invariance under replication and juxtaposition Bibliography Index.
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