This book uses formal models to explore the conditions under which nuclear agreements are credible.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
William Spaniel is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is also the author of Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook (2011).
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1. How are nuclear weapons special? 2. The theory of butter-for-bombs agreements: how potential power coerces concessions 3. Does nuclear proficiency induce compliance? 4. The diplomacy of butter-for-bombs agreements 5. Arms treaties and the changing credibility of preventive war 6. You get what you give: endogenous nuclear reversal 7. Preventive strikes: when states call the wrong 'bluff' 8. Lessons learned.
Introduction 1. How are nuclear weapons special? 2. The theory of butter-for-bombs agreements: how potential power coerces concessions 3. Does nuclear proficiency induce compliance? 4. The diplomacy of butter-for-bombs agreements 5. Arms treaties and the changing credibility of preventive war 6. You get what you give: endogenous nuclear reversal 7. Preventive strikes: when states call the wrong 'bluff' 8. Lessons learned.
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