Juan Comesaña presents a new framework for understanding the rationality of action and belief, which he calls "Experientalism". Arguing that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence as consisting of the content of undefeated experiences.
Juan Comesaña presents a new framework for understanding the rationality of action and belief, which he calls "Experientalism". Arguing that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence as consisting of the content of undefeated experiences.
Juan Comesaña is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Prior to this, he obtained his PhD from Brown University and then taught at the University of Wisconsin, Madison for six years. He works mainly in epistemology, though he is also interested in metaphysics and metaethics.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Introduction 2: Probability and Decision Theory 3: Objective Bayesianism and Knowledge-First Epistemolog 4: Knowledge-Based Decision Theory 5: Excuses, Would-Be Knowledge, and Rationality-Based Decision Theory 6: Experientialism 7: The Normative Force of Unjustified Beliefs 8: The Problem of Easy Rationality 9: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Evidentialist Reliabilism? 10: Conclusion
1: Introduction 2: Probability and Decision Theory 3: Objective Bayesianism and Knowledge-First Epistemolog 4: Knowledge-Based Decision Theory 5: Excuses, Would-Be Knowledge, and Rationality-Based Decision Theory 6: Experientialism 7: The Normative Force of Unjustified Beliefs 8: The Problem of Easy Rationality 9: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Evidentialist Reliabilism? 10: Conclusion
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