Being Reduced
New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation
Herausgeber: Hohwy, Jakob; Kallestrup, Jesper
Being Reduced
New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation
Herausgeber: Hohwy, Jakob; Kallestrup, Jesper
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Is the mind nothing but neural firings in the brain? Are we just a bunch of neurons? If the mind is just the brain, then how can we act as genuine, responsible agents in the world? Being Reduced attempts to understand these questions.
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Is the mind nothing but neural firings in the brain? Are we just a bunch of neurons? If the mind is just the brain, then how can we act as genuine, responsible agents in the world? Being Reduced attempts to understand these questions.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 324
- Erscheinungstermin: 15. November 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 165mm x 28mm
- Gewicht: 658g
- ISBN-13: 9780199211531
- ISBN-10: 0199211531
- Artikelnr.: 24765153
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 324
- Erscheinungstermin: 15. November 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 165mm x 28mm
- Gewicht: 658g
- ISBN-13: 9780199211531
- ISBN-10: 0199211531
- Artikelnr.: 24765153
Jakob Hohwy obtained his PhD from the Australian National University. He is a lecturer in philosophy at Monash University, Melbourne. Hohwy works on issues of reduction and explanation in science, and engages in interdisciplinary research with neuroscientists and psychiatrists. Jesper Kallestrup obtained his PhD from the University of St. Andrews. He is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and an associate fellow at Arché, the University of St. Andrews. Kallestrup works on issues of reduction, mental causation and the conceivability arguments in the philosophy of mind.
* Introduction
* 1: Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Rosalyn Stewart: Reduction and
Embodied Cognition:Perspectives from Medicine and Psychiatry
* 2: John Bickle: Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not
Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!)
* 3: Peter Godfrey-Smith: Reduction in Real Life
* 4: Christian List and Philip Pettit: Group Agency and Supervenience
* 5: Jaegwon Kim: Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible
without the Other?
* 6: Peter Lipton: CP Laws, Reduction, and Explanatory Pluralism
* 7: David Papineau: Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?
* 8: Barry Loewer: Why There Is Anything except Physics
* 9: Louise Antony: Multiple realisation: keeping it real
* 10: Tim Crane: Causation and determinable properties: on the efficacy
of colour, shape and size
* 11: Peter Menzies: The exclusion problem, the determination relation,
and contrastive causation
* 12: James Woodward: Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms
* 13: Daniel Stoljar: Distinctions in Distinction
* 14: Karen Bennett: Exclusion again
* Index
* 1: Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Rosalyn Stewart: Reduction and
Embodied Cognition:Perspectives from Medicine and Psychiatry
* 2: John Bickle: Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not
Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!)
* 3: Peter Godfrey-Smith: Reduction in Real Life
* 4: Christian List and Philip Pettit: Group Agency and Supervenience
* 5: Jaegwon Kim: Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible
without the Other?
* 6: Peter Lipton: CP Laws, Reduction, and Explanatory Pluralism
* 7: David Papineau: Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?
* 8: Barry Loewer: Why There Is Anything except Physics
* 9: Louise Antony: Multiple realisation: keeping it real
* 10: Tim Crane: Causation and determinable properties: on the efficacy
of colour, shape and size
* 11: Peter Menzies: The exclusion problem, the determination relation,
and contrastive causation
* 12: James Woodward: Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms
* 13: Daniel Stoljar: Distinctions in Distinction
* 14: Karen Bennett: Exclusion again
* Index
* Introduction
* 1: Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Rosalyn Stewart: Reduction and
Embodied Cognition:Perspectives from Medicine and Psychiatry
* 2: John Bickle: Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not
Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!)
* 3: Peter Godfrey-Smith: Reduction in Real Life
* 4: Christian List and Philip Pettit: Group Agency and Supervenience
* 5: Jaegwon Kim: Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible
without the Other?
* 6: Peter Lipton: CP Laws, Reduction, and Explanatory Pluralism
* 7: David Papineau: Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?
* 8: Barry Loewer: Why There Is Anything except Physics
* 9: Louise Antony: Multiple realisation: keeping it real
* 10: Tim Crane: Causation and determinable properties: on the efficacy
of colour, shape and size
* 11: Peter Menzies: The exclusion problem, the determination relation,
and contrastive causation
* 12: James Woodward: Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms
* 13: Daniel Stoljar: Distinctions in Distinction
* 14: Karen Bennett: Exclusion again
* Index
* 1: Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Rosalyn Stewart: Reduction and
Embodied Cognition:Perspectives from Medicine and Psychiatry
* 2: John Bickle: Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not
Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!)
* 3: Peter Godfrey-Smith: Reduction in Real Life
* 4: Christian List and Philip Pettit: Group Agency and Supervenience
* 5: Jaegwon Kim: Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible
without the Other?
* 6: Peter Lipton: CP Laws, Reduction, and Explanatory Pluralism
* 7: David Papineau: Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?
* 8: Barry Loewer: Why There Is Anything except Physics
* 9: Louise Antony: Multiple realisation: keeping it real
* 10: Tim Crane: Causation and determinable properties: on the efficacy
of colour, shape and size
* 11: Peter Menzies: The exclusion problem, the determination relation,
and contrastive causation
* 12: James Woodward: Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms
* 13: Daniel Stoljar: Distinctions in Distinction
* 14: Karen Bennett: Exclusion again
* Index