First published in 1999, this volume re-examines Bertrand Russell's views on modal logic and logical relevance, arguing that Russell does in fact accommodate modality and modal logic.
First published in 1999, this volume re-examines Bertrand Russell's views on modal logic and logical relevance, arguing that Russell does in fact accommodate modality and modal logic.
Jan Dejnozka is a visiting scholar of Law and Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His articles have appeared in Russell, International Studies in Philosophy, Dialogos and The International Journal for Philosophy.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction. 2. Propositional Functions and Possible Worlds. 3. Russell's Three Levels of Modality. 4. The Ontological Foundation. 5. Rescher's Case Against Russell. 6. The Strength of Russell's Modal Logic. 7. Does Russell Have a Possible Worlds Logic? 8. The Motives and Origins of Russell's Theory of Modality. 9. Russell's Relevance Logic. 10. Russell, Keynes, and the Legal Origins of Logical Relevance.
1. Introduction. 2. Propositional Functions and Possible Worlds. 3. Russell's Three Levels of Modality. 4. The Ontological Foundation. 5. Rescher's Case Against Russell. 6. The Strength of Russell's Modal Logic. 7. Does Russell Have a Possible Worlds Logic? 8. The Motives and Origins of Russell's Theory of Modality. 9. Russell's Relevance Logic. 10. Russell, Keynes, and the Legal Origins of Logical Relevance.
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