Martin Smith explores the question of what it takes for a belief to be justified or rational. He argues that in order to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it¿roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation.
Martin Smith explores the question of what it takes for a belief to be justified or rational. He argues that in order to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it¿roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation.
Martin Smith completed a PhD at the Australian National University in 2005 and relocated to the UK in 2006. He is currently a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction: The Risk Minimisation Conception of Justification 1: Two Epistemic Goals 2: What Justifies Belief 3: Justification and Lotteries 4: Multiple Premise Closure 5: Comparative Justification 6: Protection from Error 7: Similar Worlds, Normal Worlds 8: Introducing Degrees 9: Refining Risk Minimisation: The Impossibility Results Bibliography Index
Introduction: The Risk Minimisation Conception of Justification 1: Two Epistemic Goals 2: What Justifies Belief 3: Justification and Lotteries 4: Multiple Premise Closure 5: Comparative Justification 6: Protection from Error 7: Similar Worlds, Normal Worlds 8: Introducing Degrees 9: Refining Risk Minimisation: The Impossibility Results Bibliography Index
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