The first text to provide understanding of the important new issue of Big Data and how it relates to competition laws and policy, both in the EU and US.
The first text to provide understanding of the important new issue of Big Data and how it relates to competition laws and policy, both in the EU and US.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Maurice Stucke, Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law, Allen Grunes, Antitrust Lawyer, Konkurrenz Group
Inhaltsangabe
* 1: Introduction * 1. THE GROWING DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY * 2.: Defining Big Data * 3.: Smartphones as an Example of how Big Data and Privacy Intersect * 4.: The Competitive Significance of Big Data * 5.: Why Haven't Market Forces Addressed Consumers' Privacy Concerns? * PART II: THE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES' MIXED RECORD IN RECOGNIZING DATA'S IMPORTANCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FEW FIRMS' UNPARALLELED SYSTEM OF HARVESTING AND MONETIZING THEIR DATA TROVE * 6.: The US's and EU's Mixed Record in Assessing Data-Driven Mergers * PART III: WHY HAVEN'T MANY COMPETITION AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE IMPLICATIONS OF BIG DATA? * 7.: Agencies Focus on What Is Measurable (Price), Which Isn't Always Important (Free Goods) * 8.: Data-Driven Mergers Often Fall Outside Competition Policy's Conventional Categories * 9.: Belief that Privacy Concerns Differ from Competition Policy Objectives * PART IV: WHAT ARE THE RISKS IF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IGNORE OR DOWNPLAY BIG DATA? * 10.: Importance of Entry Barriers in Antitrust Analysis * 11.: Entry Barriers Can Be Higher in Multi-Sided Markets, Where One Side Exhibits Traditional Network Effects * 12.: Scale of Data Trial-and-Error, 'Learning-by-Doing' Network Effects * 13.: Two More Network Effects: Scope of Data and Spill-over Effects * 14.: Reflections on Data-Driven Network Effects * 15.: Risk of Inadequate Merger Enforcement * 16.: The Price of Weak Antitrust Enforcement * PART V: ADVANCING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE AGENCIES AND ACADEMICS * 17.: Recognizing When Privacy and Competition Law Intersect * 18.: Data-opoly: Identifying Data-Driven Exclusionary and Predatory Conduct * 19.: Understanding and Assessing Data-Driven Efficiencies Claims * 20.: Need for Retrospectives of Data-Driven Mergers * 21.: More Coordination among Competition, Privacy and Consumer Protection Officials * 22.: Conclusion
* 1: Introduction * 1. THE GROWING DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY * 2.: Defining Big Data * 3.: Smartphones as an Example of how Big Data and Privacy Intersect * 4.: The Competitive Significance of Big Data * 5.: Why Haven't Market Forces Addressed Consumers' Privacy Concerns? * PART II: THE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES' MIXED RECORD IN RECOGNIZING DATA'S IMPORTANCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FEW FIRMS' UNPARALLELED SYSTEM OF HARVESTING AND MONETIZING THEIR DATA TROVE * 6.: The US's and EU's Mixed Record in Assessing Data-Driven Mergers * PART III: WHY HAVEN'T MANY COMPETITION AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE IMPLICATIONS OF BIG DATA? * 7.: Agencies Focus on What Is Measurable (Price), Which Isn't Always Important (Free Goods) * 8.: Data-Driven Mergers Often Fall Outside Competition Policy's Conventional Categories * 9.: Belief that Privacy Concerns Differ from Competition Policy Objectives * PART IV: WHAT ARE THE RISKS IF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IGNORE OR DOWNPLAY BIG DATA? * 10.: Importance of Entry Barriers in Antitrust Analysis * 11.: Entry Barriers Can Be Higher in Multi-Sided Markets, Where One Side Exhibits Traditional Network Effects * 12.: Scale of Data Trial-and-Error, 'Learning-by-Doing' Network Effects * 13.: Two More Network Effects: Scope of Data and Spill-over Effects * 14.: Reflections on Data-Driven Network Effects * 15.: Risk of Inadequate Merger Enforcement * 16.: The Price of Weak Antitrust Enforcement * PART V: ADVANCING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE AGENCIES AND ACADEMICS * 17.: Recognizing When Privacy and Competition Law Intersect * 18.: Data-opoly: Identifying Data-Driven Exclusionary and Predatory Conduct * 19.: Understanding and Assessing Data-Driven Efficiencies Claims * 20.: Need for Retrospectives of Data-Driven Mergers * 21.: More Coordination among Competition, Privacy and Consumer Protection Officials * 22.: Conclusion
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