Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Know Your Enemy: A Comparison of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Opposing Forces (Opfor) Motorized Rifle Regiment]( "Know Your Enemy: A Comparison of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Opposing Forces (Opfor) Motorized Rifle Regiment")
Know Your Enemy: A Comparison of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Opposing Forces (Opfor) Motorized Rifle Regiment60,99 €![Is U.S. Army Rear Area and Base Security Doctrine Sound for Sustaining Operations on the Noncontiguous Nonlinear Battlefield?]( "Is U.S. Army Rear Area and Base Security Doctrine Sound for Sustaining Operations on the Noncontiguous Nonlinear Battlefield?")
Is U.S. Army Rear Area and Base Security Doctrine Sound for Sustaining Operations on the Noncontiguous Nonlinear Battlefield?60,99 €![Blind Man's Bluff: A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division]( "Blind Man's Bluff: A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division")
Blind Man's Bluff: A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division61,99 €![Principles of War and Rear Area Protection: Have We Achieved Economy of Force?]( "Principles of War and Rear Area Protection: Have We Achieved Economy of Force?")
Principles of War and Rear Area Protection: Have We Achieved Economy of Force?60,99 €![Soviet Tactical Surprise: The Doctrine and how to Counter it]( "Soviet Tactical Surprise: The Doctrine and how to Counter it")
Soviet Tactical Surprise: The Doctrine and how to Counter it60,99 €![Soviet and U.S. Army Operational and Tactical Logistics]( "Soviet and U.S. Army Operational and Tactical Logistics")
Soviet and U.S. Army Operational and Tactical Logistics61,99 €![Financial Feasibility and Merits of the Small Lightweight Tactical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Satellites Compared to National Syst]( "Financial Feasibility and Merits of the Small Lightweight Tactical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Satellites Compared to National Syst")
Financial Feasibility and Merits of the Small Lightweight Tactical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Satellites Compared to National Syst60,99 €
This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively. A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the U.S. Army's counterreconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for "seeing" through the depth of the modern battlefield. The monograph stresses the correlation between the Soviet reconnaissance effort and their doctrine of developing operations into the tactical and operational depth of the battlefield. Consequently, Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operate in American rear areas. The monograph concludes with the suggestion that the U.S. Army should place greater emphasis on counter reconnaissance in its own rear areas -- in effect, blinding the enemy.