After fascism's defeat in 1945 Britain did not co-operate with Franco's Spanish opponents to end his dictatorship. This study demonstrates how divisions in the Spanish opposition were one factor but argues that Britain's strategic and commercial interests in Spain also acted as a disincentive. Only when international pressure for sanctions threatened Iberian stability in 1947 did the British government turn to the Spanish opposition. With the advent of the Cold War, however, the opposition became irrelevant to British needs and Franco's survival was guaranteed.
'The virtues of Dunthorn's study are many and incontestible...may well be the last word that needs to be said on Great Britain's role...' - American Historical Review
'An impressive study of the problems of attempting to pursue an ethical foreign policy. [Dunthorn] shows clearly the fundamental clash between Britain's long-term strategic geopolitical interests and the elimination of all aspects of international facism.' - David J. Dunthorn, Times LIterary Supplement
'An impressive study of the problems of attempting to pursue an ethical foreign policy. [Dunthorn] shows clearly the fundamental clash between Britain's long-term strategic geopolitical interests and the elimination of all aspects of international facism.' - David J. Dunthorn, Times LIterary Supplement