Moeed Yusuf

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments

U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Moeed Yusuf, PhD, is Associate Vice President of the Asia center at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is the editor of Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge and Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia and co-editor of South Asia 2060 and Getting it Right in Afghanistan.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 320
• Erscheinungstermin: 8. Mai 2018
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 160mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 612g
• ISBN-13: 9781503604858
• ISBN-10: 1503604853
• Artikelnr.: 49389648

Autorenporträt

Moeed Yusuf, PhD, is Associate Vice President of the Asia center at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is the editor of Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge and Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia and co-editor of South Asia 2060 and Getting it Right in Afghanistan.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
Introduction: Regional Nuclear Crises in a Unipolar World
chapter abstract
The Introduction lays the groundwork for the rest of the book by
introducing the need for a theory of nuclear crisis behavior centered on
third-party mediation. Specifically, how does the presence of the unipole
and stronger third parties alter the crisis behavior of regional nuclear
powers situated within a unipolar world? And what implications does this
have for crisis management, stability, and outcomes? The chapter introduces
the puzzle and explains the book's empirical focus on South Asia by
highlighting that India and Pakistan are the only regional nuclear powers
to have experienced major crises since the end of the Cold War. The chapter
also summarizes the key findings from the three case studies, the 1999
Kargil conflict, the 2001-2002 military standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai
crisis, and confirms evidence in line with the proposed theory of brokered
bargaining.
1Understanding Nuclear Crisis Behavior: A Survey of the Literature
chapter abstract
This chapter surveys the literature on nuclear crises. It begins by
summarizing the Cold War treatment of these episodes, highlighting the
centrality of bilateral deterrence and models such as "brinkmanship" in
creating expectations for nuclear crisis behavior. Even though third-party
actors remained important as superpower allies during the Cold War,
literature during this period suffered from a two-actor bias flowing from
the global hegemony of the superpowers. Post-Cold War literature tends to
account for regional nuclearization and unipolarity but in summarizing this
body of work, the chapter identifies that there is still insufficient
knowledge of the various factors at play in regional nuclear crises.
2Setting Up the Inquiry: An Introduction to Brokered Bargaining
chapter abstract
This chapter introduces brokered bargaining as a three-actor model that
explains patterns of state behavior in regional crises in a unipolar global
setting. The chapter presents ten propositions that are posited to
collectively shape crisis behavior of the United States and other strong
states acting as third-party mediators and of regional rivals. Crisis
behavior of regional rivals ought to be marked by a constant tension
between their incentives to pursue their maximalist objectives and their
compulsion not to defy the third party completely given its power to tilt
the crisis decisively against them. The third party would seek to heighten
the antagonists' sensitivity to its preference for de-escalation ahead of
their ideal crisis outcomes. Brokered bargaining unpacks the processes and
mechanisms that underpin this trilateral interaction. The last part of the
chapter presents the methodology applied to the case studies in the next
section of the book.
3The Kargil Crisis
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan,
and establishes that what may otherwise be construed as a classic limited
war where major conflict was avoided due to nuclear deterrence was in
reality a display of brokered bargaining. This entailed the United States
and other major powers ignoring Pakistan's effort to manipulate the risk of
war and its pleas for support to help terminate the crisis while it was in
possession of forcibly occupied territory in Indian Kashmir. They deemed
Pakistan's unilateral withdrawal to be the most realistic and efficient way
of ensuring crisis termination. India reacted militarily to Pakistan's
provocation but kept its actions limited to retain international goodwill
and get the third party to make efforts to ensure Pakistan's withdrawal.
The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation introduced due to
India's and Pakistan's misperceptions of the third party's outlook toward
the crisis.
4The 2001-2002 Military Standoff
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the 2001-2002 military standoff that kept India and
Pakistan on the verge of war for ten months. Brokered bargaining
characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party.
India threatened to use military force but pulled back at critical
junctures as the United States acted as a guarantor of Pakistan's promises
of curbing cross-border terrorism and raised India's costs of defying
third-party demands to de-escalate. Pakistan promised retaliation against
India and harmed the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan by withdrawing
forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but this "autonomous" behavior
was trumped by its propensity to oblige the United States by accepting some
responsibility for anti-India terrorism and acting tangibly against
militants. The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation
introduced by India's and Pakistan's misperceptions of the third party's
leverage over the opponent.
5The Mumbai Crisis
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the 2008 Mumbai crisis and shows that brokered
bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led
third party. In a situation that could have boiled over given the
spectacular nature of the terrorist attacks that triggered the crisis,
India, Pakistan, and the United States exhibited an even greater sense of
familiarity with the opportunities and limitations associated with the
trilateral bargaining framework. Despite threatening military action at
times, India relied almost exclusively on the United States to pursue its
crisis objectives. Without boxing it in completely, the United States
pressured Pakistan and forced it to take actions against terrorists
believed to be linked to the attacks, and used this to pacify India. The
centrality of the third-party strand of crisis management helps explain the
prudence both sides exhibited in avoiding brinkmanship.
6Brokered Bargaining: Observations and Lessons for South Asia
chapter abstract
Drawing on the case studies, this chapter examines the applicability of
brokered bargaining in South Asia's first decade of overt nuclearization
and its implications for crisis stability. In each crisis, the concern
about escalation forced the United States and other strong states to
engage, largely unsolicited, and use a mix of rewards and threats with the
regional rivals to achieve de-escalation. Both India and Pakistan eagerly
engaged the third-party and oscillated between manipulating the risk of war
and deferring to its preferences to gain its support. The process
encompassing this dynamic interaction explained both the specific choices
and the overall crisis behavior of the three actors. Escalation risks due
to the "moral hazard problem," the "multiple-audience problem," and the
peacetime policy choices of the antagonists and the United States were
present.
7Beyond South Asia: Generalizing the Application of Brokered Bargaining
chapter abstract
This chapter addresses the general applicability of brokered bargaining
beyond South Asia, focusing on four prototypes of rivalries: between
countries that are considered friends of the unipole (futuristic crisis
scenarios involving Israel versus a nuclear Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or
Egypt); between a friend and foe of the unipole (Israel versus a nuclear
Iran); between a foe of the unipole and an ally with formally extended
deterrence guarantees (Korean peninsula); and between a friend and a
presumptive great power rival of the unipole (India versus China). The
discussion establishes the similarities and differences of these prototypes
with the South Asian cases. While each presents a somewhat distinct set of
challenges for third-party actors, the fundamental crisis dynamic whereby
the third party works to secure de-escalation without seeking to alienate
either conflicting party completely and the antagonists feel compelled not
to defy it outright remains valid in each case.
8Brokered Bargaining: Implications for Theory and Practice
chapter abstract
This chapter reflects on the theoretical and practical implications of the
book. It highlights the work's contribution to the otherwise undertheorized
role of third parties in preventing war, its fresh perspectives on the
optimism-pessimism debate on nuclear deterrence, and its attention to
scholarship on nonnuclear subjects, primarily mediation, unipolarity
theory, and sociological literature on "evaluation" by external audiences.
The discussion highlights policy recommendations for decision makers in the
United States, other third-party states, India, Pakistan, and other
potential regional nuclear rivals. It stresses the need for a holistic U.S.
policy approach to crises between regional nuclear powers.