Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![A Cyber Special Program Office: Managing the Enterprise as a Weapon System for Better Information Sharing in the DOD]( "A Cyber Special Program Office: Managing the Enterprise as a Weapon System for Better Information Sharing in the DOD")
A Cyber Special Program Office: Managing the Enterprise as a Weapon System for Better Information Sharing in the DOD61,99 €![A Flowchart to Source Code Conversion Program for GPSS/360]( "A Flowchart to Source Code Conversion Program for GPSS/360")
A Flowchart to Source Code Conversion Program for GPSS/36060,99 €![End-Of-Pilot Assessment of the U.S. Army's Consolidated Recruiting Program]( "End-Of-Pilot Assessment of the U.S. Army's Consolidated Recruiting Program")
End-Of-Pilot Assessment of the U.S. Army's Consolidated Recruiting Program18,99 €![The Infantry Brigade Combat Team: The U.S. Army's Premier Phase IV and Irregular Warfare Force for the 21st Century]( "The Infantry Brigade Combat Team: The U.S. Army's Premier Phase IV and Irregular Warfare Force for the 21st Century")
The Infantry Brigade Combat Team: The U.S. Army's Premier Phase IV and Irregular Warfare Force for the 21st Century60,99 €![Tactical Economics: The U.S. Army's Tactical Contribution to Economic Development]( "Tactical Economics: The U.S. Army's Tactical Contribution to Economic Development")
Tactical Economics: The U.S. Army's Tactical Contribution to Economic Development60,99 €![Improving the Analyst and Decision-Maker's Perspective through Uncertainty Visualization]( "Improving the Analyst and Decision-Maker's Perspective through Uncertainty Visualization")
Improving the Analyst and Decision-Maker's Perspective through Uncertainty Visualization61,99 €![Cost Management Competencies: The Importance and Frequency as Seen by the Financial Analyst]( "Cost Management Competencies: The Importance and Frequency as Seen by the Financial Analyst")
Cost Management Competencies: The Importance and Frequency as Seen by the Financial Analyst60,99 €
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the intelligence community saw a dark shadow cast across itself. Though the specific intelligence failures cannot yet be determined, there are some known pieces of information. The success of intelligence during the Cold War, a predictable bi-polar war, resulted in a strategic intelligence system that supported the information requirements of that bi-polar world. Our intelligence analyst trained to use deductive skills to quantitatively determine the internal and external jostling of the bi-polar system. Since the end of the Cold War, America's adversaries have undergone significant transformation moving away from standing formation armies prepared for force on force battles. Rising from the ashes of the relatively predictable bi-polar global system are new networks and bands of ideologically and culturally motivated groups capable of exercising the power of globalization while taking advantage of both tacit and complicit state support. While US military analysts ardently constructed a mostly quantitative method of analysis to determine how former adversaries executed their game plan, the cultural complexities of the current global construct do not behave in manners friendly to this form of analysis beyond the local tactical level. Accordingly, senior intelligence analysts, in particular, now find themselves ill equipped to understand, much less predict, our nation's new real and potential adversaries. This monograph explores the development of intelligence analysts from their indoctrination through positions of senior intelligence analysts charged with scrutinizing strategic concepts and providing strategic recommendations. It compares current methodologies used to produce adaptive, effective senior intelligence analysts necessary for today's complex battlefields in non-Department of Defense agencies to those used within the United States Army. It seeks to answer the question: does the intelligence school in the United State