Bryan R. Early

Busted Sanctions

Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Bryan R. Early is an Assistant Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany, SUNY and the founding Director of the Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft at the Center for Policy Research.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 288
• Erscheinungstermin: 11. Februar 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 226mm x 151mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 470g
• ISBN-13: 9780804794138
• ISBN-10: 0804794138
• Artikelnr.: 41752465

Autorenporträt

Bryan R. Early is an Assistant Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany, SUNY and the founding Director of the Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft at the Center for Policy Research.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction: Why Busted Sanctions Lead to Broken Sanctions Policies
chapter abstract
This chapter offers an overview of why U.S. policy makers employ economic
sanctions, the wide range of adverse effects that sanctions have, and the
poor track record of success that sanctions have had. It explains how
economic sanctions affect their targets and incentivize different types of
responses from third-party states that vary from cooperating with them to
actively undermining them. The chapter then summarizes the theory of
sanctions busting, explaining why extensive sanctions busters emerge and
how their sanctions-busting aid and trade impact the effectiveness of
sanctioning efforts. The chapter then discusses the mixed-method research
design that will be used to evaluate the theory of sanctions busting and
describes the book's findings in brief.
2What Are Sanctions Busters?
chapter abstract
This chapter explains how economic sanctions incentivize their targets to
try to forge extensive commercial ties with small numbers of third-party
states and to seek out the patronage of benefactors willing to provide them
with extensive aid packages. It describes the role that sanctions busters
can play in undermining sanctioning efforts via their aid and trade and
explains why past approaches have been unable to systematically account for
these effects. The chapter draws on the South African and North Korean
sanctions episodes to illustrate the motives that appear to drive aid-based
versus traded-based sanctions busting and presents distinct profiles for
the types of states most likely to become aid-based sanctions busters and
trade-based sanctions busters.
3Assessing the Consequences of Sanctions Busting
chapter abstract
This chapter develops the theory of sanctions busting's explanation of how
trade-based sanctions busters and target states' foreign aid flows
influence the outcomes of sanctions episodes. It is hypothesized that
sanctions imposed against states that have the support of trade-based
sanctions busters are less likely to be successful. It is also hypothesized
that target states' sensitivity to changes in their foreign aid flows means
that sanctions will be less successful against states experiencing gains in
their foreign aid flows and more successful against states experiencing
declines in their foreign aid flows. These hypotheses are evaluated via a
statistical analysis of ninety-six episodes of U.S.-imposed economic
sanctions from 1950 through 2002. The results offer strong support for the
hypotheses, indicating that trade-based sanctions busters and foreign aid
flows each exert separate, potent effects on sanctions outcomes.
4For Profits or Politics? Why Third Parties Sanctions-Bust via Trade and
Aid
chapter abstract
This chapter develops the theory of sanctions busting's explanation for why
third-party states become aid-based sanctions busters or trade-based
sanctions busters in a given sanctions episode. It explains that
trade-based sanctions busting is driven primarily by the commercial
interests of third-party states to exploit the lucrative trading
opportunities created by sanctions, whereas aid-based sanctions-busting is
primarily motivated by third-party governments' political interests in
preventing the sanctions against a target from succeeding. It is argued
that third-party governments will prefer to employ trade-based sanctions
busting if that option is feasible because that approach is profitable
instead of costly. The chapter poses a suite of hypotheses to test the
theory's predictions concerning which states will engage in aid-based and
trade-based sanctions busting.
5Sanctions Busting for Profits: How the United Arab Emirates Busted the
U.S. Sanctions against Iran
chapter abstract
This chapter examines how and why trade-based sanctions-busting
relationships are fostered. It evaluates the trade-based sanctions-busting
relationship that formed between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran
after the United States sanctioned Iran in 1979. The chapter examines the
formation and evolution of the sanctions-busting relationship during the
period that preceded the military alliance the UAE formed with the United
States (1979-1994) and period that followed the creation of their alliance
(1995-2005). The analysis reveals insights into how the emirate of Dubai
emerged as the leading venue for conducting sanctions-busting trade with
Iran. The chapter also illustrates how even American firms used Dubai to
circumvent the U.S. government's sanctions. Its postscript analyzes how
recent changes in U.S. sanctions policies (2006-2013) have finally begun to
succeed in curbing the sanctions busting taking place on Iran's behalf in
the UAE and other countries.
6Assessing Which Third-Party States Become Trade-Based Sanctions Busters
chapter abstract
This chapter conducts a statistical analysis of the factors associated with
trade-based sanctions busting. It tests whether the hypothesized factors
affecting trade profitability influence which third-party states become
trade-based sanctions busters. It reexamines the same ninety-six episodes
of U.S.-imposed sanctions evaluated in Chapter 3 but this time looks at
which third-party states sanctions-busted on behalf of the target states.
The results offer strong support for the sanctions-busting theory's
hypotheses, indicating that cross-national differences in the factors
affecting the profitability of trading with sanctioned states largely
determine which third-party states become trade-based sanctions busters.
The results indicate that countries with large, open economies that are
proximate to and have preexisting commercial ties with target states are
significantly more likely to engage in trade-based sanctions busting, as
are countries allied with the United States and/or the target state.
7Sanctions Busting for Politics: Analyzing Cuba's Aid-Based Sanctions
Busters
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the role that aid-based sanctions busting has played
in sustaining Cuba since the United States first sanctioned it in 1960 and
why several countries have offered Cuba their patronage. It analyzes
whether the aid-based sanctions-busting support that China and the Soviet
Union offered to Cuba during the Cold War and that China and Venezuela
offered it following the Cold War's conclusion were consistent with the
sanctions-busting theory's hypothesized conditions. The evidence from these
cases generally offers support for the theory, but the analysis of China
case reveals that third-party states can occasionally employ both aid-based
and trade-based sanctions-busting strategies. The narrative also presents
detailed insights into the diplomatic efforts undertaken by U.S. policy
makers to discourage trade-based sanctions busting on Cuba's behalf and
those undertaken by Fidel Castro to woo the support of aid-based sanctions
busters.
8Implications and Conclusions
chapter abstract
This chapter offers a summary analysis of the overarching findings of the
book and explores their implications for policy makers and the broader
study of economic statecraft. It summarizes the overarching threat that
sanctions busting poses to the effectiveness of sanctioning efforts and
offers a number of recommendations about how policy makers can best respond
to them. It is argued that while sanctions busters will continue to
represent an endemic challenge to sanctioning efforts, they pose problems
that can be anticipated and, in some cases, mitigated if properly
understood. The chapter concludes by examining how future research can
build on the insights garnered from the book.