Cases in European Competition Policy
The Economic Analysis
Herausgeber: Lyons, Bruce
Cases in European Competition Policy
The Economic Analysis
Herausgeber: Lyons, Bruce
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A demonstration of how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe.
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A demonstration of how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 512
- Erscheinungstermin: 13. April 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 874g
- ISBN-13: 9780521713504
- ISBN-10: 0521713501
- Artikelnr.: 26424248
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 512
- Erscheinungstermin: 13. April 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 874g
- ISBN-13: 9780521713504
- ISBN-10: 0521713501
- Artikelnr.: 26424248
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Preface;
Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce
Lyons; Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power:
Introduction; Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position: 1. Michelin II: the
treatment of rebates Massimo Motta; 2. Interoperability and market
foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 2. Market Investigations: 3. Mobile call termination in the
UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright; 4.
Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets
(2000) Paul Dobson; Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction;
Section 1. Cartels: 5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter?
Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan; 6. Assessment of damages in the district
heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard; Section 2. Other Horizontal
Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in
a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet; 8. The orders and rules of British
horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided
sport? Bruce Lyons; Section 3. Vertical Agreements: 9. Efficiency enhancing
or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car
distribution in Europe Frank Verboven; 10. Beer - the ties that bind
Michael Waterson; 11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo
dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit; Part III. Mergers:
Introduction; Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects: 12. A merger in
the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than
expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi; 13. Merger simulations of
unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry?
Margaret Slade; Section 2. Coordinated Effects: 14. The ups and downs of
the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy
Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright; 15. Capacity
constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective
dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects: 16. Vertical effects
between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in
Finland Rune Stenbacka; 17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects:
the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero;
Index.
Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce
Lyons; Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power:
Introduction; Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position: 1. Michelin II: the
treatment of rebates Massimo Motta; 2. Interoperability and market
foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 2. Market Investigations: 3. Mobile call termination in the
UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright; 4.
Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets
(2000) Paul Dobson; Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction;
Section 1. Cartels: 5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter?
Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan; 6. Assessment of damages in the district
heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard; Section 2. Other Horizontal
Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in
a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet; 8. The orders and rules of British
horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided
sport? Bruce Lyons; Section 3. Vertical Agreements: 9. Efficiency enhancing
or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car
distribution in Europe Frank Verboven; 10. Beer - the ties that bind
Michael Waterson; 11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo
dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit; Part III. Mergers:
Introduction; Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects: 12. A merger in
the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than
expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi; 13. Merger simulations of
unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry?
Margaret Slade; Section 2. Coordinated Effects: 14. The ups and downs of
the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy
Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright; 15. Capacity
constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective
dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects: 16. Vertical effects
between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in
Finland Rune Stenbacka; 17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects:
the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero;
Index.
List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Preface;
Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce
Lyons; Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power:
Introduction; Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position: 1. Michelin II: the
treatment of rebates Massimo Motta; 2. Interoperability and market
foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 2. Market Investigations: 3. Mobile call termination in the
UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright; 4.
Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets
(2000) Paul Dobson; Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction;
Section 1. Cartels: 5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter?
Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan; 6. Assessment of damages in the district
heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard; Section 2. Other Horizontal
Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in
a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet; 8. The orders and rules of British
horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided
sport? Bruce Lyons; Section 3. Vertical Agreements: 9. Efficiency enhancing
or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car
distribution in Europe Frank Verboven; 10. Beer - the ties that bind
Michael Waterson; 11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo
dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit; Part III. Mergers:
Introduction; Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects: 12. A merger in
the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than
expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi; 13. Merger simulations of
unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry?
Margaret Slade; Section 2. Coordinated Effects: 14. The ups and downs of
the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy
Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright; 15. Capacity
constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective
dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects: 16. Vertical effects
between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in
Finland Rune Stenbacka; 17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects:
the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero;
Index.
Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce
Lyons; Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power:
Introduction; Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position: 1. Michelin II: the
treatment of rebates Massimo Motta; 2. Interoperability and market
foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 2. Market Investigations: 3. Mobile call termination in the
UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright; 4.
Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets
(2000) Paul Dobson; Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction;
Section 1. Cartels: 5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter?
Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan; 6. Assessment of damages in the district
heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard; Section 2. Other Horizontal
Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in
a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet; 8. The orders and rules of British
horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided
sport? Bruce Lyons; Section 3. Vertical Agreements: 9. Efficiency enhancing
or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car
distribution in Europe Frank Verboven; 10. Beer - the ties that bind
Michael Waterson; 11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo
dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit; Part III. Mergers:
Introduction; Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects: 12. A merger in
the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than
expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi; 13. Merger simulations of
unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry?
Margaret Slade; Section 2. Coordinated Effects: 14. The ups and downs of
the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy
Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright; 15. Capacity
constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective
dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen; Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects: 16. Vertical effects
between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in
Finland Rune Stenbacka; 17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects:
the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero;
Index.