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Five years after Ronald Ross discovered the link between malaria and mosquitos, American entomologist Leland Howard wrote of the "mosquito evil" that occurs when "everybody's business is nobody's business." Howard's insight was largely ignored, but it captures what social scientists now refer to as the problem of collective action.
When this problem persists in the context of malaria, individuals under-provide prevention and suffer from a higher prevalence of malaria. Imagine a group of people trying to drain a pond where mosquitoes breed. Everyone in the group faces an incentive to free ride, which can hinder their drainage efforts. Thus, when people fail to resolve issues related to collective action, they submit to the "mosquito evil" and, potentially, to malaria.
This book explores Howard's logic, the economics of collective action, and the history, epidemiology, and public health of malaria to analyze the conditions under which peopleprivately resolve collective action problems associated with mosquito abatement and malaria prevention. Generally, people are more likely to resolve these problems when the benefits of abatement and prevention outweigh the costs. This logic is developed into a framework and applied to historical and modern-day issues related to malaria, including the lack or abundance of private prevention in the United States and in developing areas; malaria's resurgence in countries like China, Venezuela, and Bangladesh; and the difficulties of large-scale insecticide-treated bed net campaigns. Given this framework, we should develop a greater appreciation for entrepreneurial responses, civil society, market processes, and private forms of collective action.
When this problem persists in the context of malaria, individuals under-provide prevention and suffer from a higher prevalence of malaria. Imagine a group of people trying to drain a pond where mosquitoes breed. Everyone in the group faces an incentive to free ride, which can hinder their drainage efforts. Thus, when people fail to resolve issues related to collective action, they submit to the "mosquito evil" and, potentially, to malaria.
This book explores Howard's logic, the economics of collective action, and the history, epidemiology, and public health of malaria to analyze the conditions under which peopleprivately resolve collective action problems associated with mosquito abatement and malaria prevention. Generally, people are more likely to resolve these problems when the benefits of abatement and prevention outweigh the costs. This logic is developed into a framework and applied to historical and modern-day issues related to malaria, including the lack or abundance of private prevention in the United States and in developing areas; malaria's resurgence in countries like China, Venezuela, and Bangladesh; and the difficulties of large-scale insecticide-treated bed net campaigns. Given this framework, we should develop a greater appreciation for entrepreneurial responses, civil society, market processes, and private forms of collective action.