Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan

The Politics of Alliance
Herausgeber: Mattox, Gale A; Grenier, Stephen M

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Gale A. Mattox is Professor of Political Science at the US Naval Academy, Adjunct Professor in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University.Stephen M. Grenier is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University and George Washington University.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 352
• Erscheinungstermin: 2. Dezember 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 590g
• ISBN-13: 9780804794442
• ISBN-10: 0804794448
• Artikelnr.: 42803538

Autorenporträt

Gale A. Mattox is Professor of Political Science at the US Naval Academy, Adjunct Professor in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Stephen M. Grenier is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University and George Washington University.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction: Framing the War in Afghanistan
chapter abstract
This chapter outlines the motivations that influenced a country's decision
to join the coalition's campaign to stabilize Afghanistan. In addition, the
chapter assesses the coalition's performance since 2001 by examining how
well each country employed its military, diplomatic, or economic
capabilities. Whether it was to demonstrate solidarity with the US or to
avenge the deaths of their citizens during the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, several countries joined the coalition to defeat al
Qaeda and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Contributing nations conducted
a wide-range of air, ground, and naval combat operations while others
focused on delivering a distinctive capability that addressed a specific
operational gap. When the interests of contributing members did not align,
the coalition often failed to achieve its political and military
objectives.
2Afghanistan: The Reluctant Partner, Building a State in a Time of War
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the role of the Afghan state in the country's war
effort. Kabul is often treated as a non-entity - a set of institutions
acted upon by outsiders. The Afghan government is often seen by
international actors as no more than traditional networks of patronage, yet
there is also an elusive Afghan state attempting to exert itself. The
conflicts inside the Afghan government are many-layered and opaque.
Outcomes in Afghanistan are products of the interaction of these competing
influences. International actors undermined state-building efforts in favor
of parochial war aims, and traditional networks have subverted governance
through corruption and modernization efforts has often flouted the culture
and will of rural Afghans, focusing disproportionately on desires of the
urban citizenry.
3Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan
chapter abstract
This chapter focuses on the relationships between ISAF contributing nations
and Afghan warlords between 2001 and 2014. It shows how the latter have
instrumentalized the cross-cutting agendas of the former to maximize their
autonomy and shape the state-building process. It focuses on two typical
warlords, General Dostum, the Uzbek leader of Northern Afghanistan, and
Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed "Amir of Western Afghanistan," and their
ability to adapt to new environments, shape shift, and eventually survive,
both physically and politically. It explains how these non-state armed
actors have developed their own kind of diplomacy and taken advantage of
the heterogeneity of the international community to resist Kabul's
homogenizing pressure and remain relevant after 2001. Overall, this chapter
demonstrates how warlords keep wielding influence in the midst of a
state-building project that promotes the construction of bureaucratic
institutions.
4United States: Examining America's Longest War
chapter abstract
This chapter argues that the United States military, through a series of
intentional and unintentional actions, hindered the creation of an
effective Afghan National Army (ANA). The absence of an effective ANA was a
key reason the security situation steadily deteriorated, eventually
becoming so dire that in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates relieved
General David McKiernan, the commander of all US and coalition troops in
Afghanistan, and President Obama ordered a "top-to-bottom" policy review.
American military officials put parochial interests ahead of Afghanistan's
security needs and harmed the nascent ANA by working with local militia
forces, using US Army National Guard units to train the ANA, and creating
specialized units within the ANA. These actions undermined the ANA's combat
effectiveness, harmed the legitimacy of the fledgling Afghan government,
and served as a catalyst for corruption and patronage.
5Canada: The Evolution of a New Canadian Way of War
chapter abstract
Canada's Afghanistan war experience differed from previous conflicts in one
very significant fashion - national implementation of an integrated
governmental approach to military operations. This "whole of government"
(WoG) approach defined Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, particularly
between 2006 and 2011 in the southern province of Kandahar. This chapter
examines the development of this WoG methodology and provides a perspective
on evolving Canadian approaches to the use of its instruments of national
power in the twenty-first century.
6El Salvador: Exporting Security in the National Interest
chapter abstract
This chapter argues El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes sought to
improve his relationship with the El Salvador Armed Forces by strengthening
his country's ties with the US. The steady flow of illegal narcotics and
weapons through the Central American isthmus caused an epidemic of
gang-related violence. Funes needed the military's support to fight the
gangs, but distrust between his leftist administration and the ESAF stood
in the way of a coordinated response. He stunned political observers when
he dismissed his own political party's concerns and joined with
conservative legislators to approve the deployment of El Salvadoran troops
to Afghanistan. The US responded by providing the troops with advanced
training and equipment for use in Afghanistan, and against transnational
criminal organizations operating in El Salvador. This strengthened El
Salvadoran-American relations, improved Funes' standing with the ESAF, and
helped San Salvador develop a better-coordinated government response
against criminal entities.
7Federal Republic of Germany: The Legacy of the War in Afghanistan
chapter abstract
A member of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany has
been the third largest contributor to the Afghan mission for over a decade
and has committed the largest force second only to the United States for
the Resolute Support post-2014 phase. For Germany this commitment by the
Bundeswehr has reflected its commitment to Afghan development and has
marked significant milestone in German responsibilities as an alliance
member. Given its past decisions with respect to participation in conflict,
the longer- implications of this role are less clear. There is no doubt
that the leadership, training, and operational experience during the
Afghanistan mission have been unprecedented for the country and its
readiness for future deployments has significantly increased. But while its
role in Afghanistan has given the Bundeswehr operational experience, it
remains unclear if the country is ready for a more forward leaning
international role for Germany in the future.
8The United Kingdom: Innocence lost in the War in Afghanistan
chapter abstract
This chapter examines why a military campaign for which the British
government had such high hopes, and which domestic public opinion initially
supported, has led to major divisions within the UK and questions over its
worth. The first part examines the first phase of Britain's Afghan War. It
looks at the reasoning behind the government's decision to engage in combat
in Afghanistan and then analyzes the initial campaign from 2001-2005. The
second part reviews the second phase of the war. It considers the
government's decision to make the case for NATO to escalate its involvement
to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan and the subsequent deployment of
British forces principally to Helmand. The third part reflects on the wider
impact of the Afghan War for and on the UK.
9France: "Friend, ally but not aligned": vigilant pragmatism in Afghanistan
chapter abstract
Given that the Afghan campaign has often put great strain on US-European
relations, it is of particular interest to consider the French example,
traditionally the most unruly European NATO ally. After a historical
overview, and looking at French contributions to ANA training, COIN and
"civ-mil" policies, this article examines how the relationship between
France and NATO has changed as a result of its 13 years-long engagement in
Afghanistan. It argues that instead of driving France and the US further
apart (as might have been expected during the crises in 2006/07), the
campaign has actually reinforced many ties and contributed to a
normalization of sorts, even though a great deal of ambiguity still
characterizes the relationship.
10The Netherlands: To Fight, or not to Fight
chapter abstract
This chapter highlights how a smaller power struggled with the political,
military and financial pressures of sustained expeditionary operations and
the dissonance that emerges as domestic political considerations clash with
the military-operational reality. The Netherlands joined the coalition to
rebuild its international standing and highlight the political and defense
reforms it instituted after Dutch peacekeepers failed to prevent the 1995
murder of refugees in Srebrenica, a United Nations declared "safe area" in
Bosnia. Since the Netherlands was dependent on the NATO collective security
umbrella, the mission in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to increase
its credibility within the Alliance and to strengthen the Dutch-American
defense relationship. Dutch counterinsurgency operations in Uruzgan
province proved politically contentious due to the combat involved, which
ultimately became the pretext for the collapse of the government in 2010.
11The Visegrad Four: Achieving Long Term Security through Alliance Support
chapter abstract
This chapter focuses on the participation and contribution of the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The Visegrad Four's
participation in ISAF, first and foremost, was rooted in the perception
that it was NATO's key military operation. Each regarded ISAF's success as
a key strategic interest critical to their goal of the continued viability
of NATO, the cornerstone of their security. ISAF participation solidified
the reputations of each as solid NATO "security providers." The chapter
also examines how ISAF participation affected each state's military
capabilities and ongoing efforts for military modernization and reform in
the post-communist era. Perhaps, most importantly for all, NATO carried out
the ISAF mission and remains intact to carry on its newfound global
character.
12Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The British, Dutch, German and French
Cases
chapter abstract
This chapter examines how European allies of the United States applied COIN
in Afghanistan by examining the experiences of the United Kingdom, Germany,
the Netherlands and France. For several years after NATO assumed command of
the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2003,
the United Kingdom struggled to relearn its forgotten COIN doctrine and
strategy, while the Germans and French disputed how much NATO should engage
in civilian reconstruction work. The Dutch kept a low-profile in this
dispute while pursuing their own 'Dutch approach' in their area of
responsibility. These divergences meant that ISAF was hobbled by an ad hoc
patchwork of objectives without a clear consensus on a common strategy when
confronted with the dual missions of nation-building and counterinsurgency.
13North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Transformation Under Fire
chapter abstract
The events of September 11, 2001 prompted NATO into action when it invoked
Article V (collective defense) for the first time and subsequently led to
the formation of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan
(ISAF). The following chapter provides a chronological analysis of the
Alliance's thirteen-year involvement in the war in Afghanistan and examines
the various strategic and political adjustments made by the now 28-member
alliance. After its initially low profile, NATO expanded its activities
throughout Afghanistan and assumed more and more combat missions. At first
conceived of as primarily stabilization operations, ISAF's mission would
eventually involve kinetic operations associated with counterinsurgency and
counter terrorism. Although the Alliance made tremendous progress in
adapting its strategy and tactics to an increasingly dangerous and
challenging environment, the mission also exposed serious divisions and
weaknesses as Brussels struggled with coordinating the national preferences
and divergent capabilities of its member states.
14Jordan and the United Arab Emirates: Arab Partners in Afghanistan
chapter abstract
Most accounts of the campaign in Afghanistan overlook the role of Jordan or
the UAE. In official tallies and military terms their contributions have
been miniscule and symbolic at best. Unlike others, neither has
historically significant strategic interests in Afghanistan, and it would
have been logical to free-ride on the already powerful coalition. But the
fact that these countries publically joined the coalition highlights the
complex reasons countries contributed to the campaign and illustrates
remarkable flexibility in the form and substance of coalition burden
sharing. We argue that their role must be considered in the context of
their security environment, their relationship with the United States, and
the larger pursuit of securing their interests against the threat of
radical Islam, bolstering a national identity premised on more moderate
interpretations of Islam, providing important diplomatic and strategic
assets to the coalition.
15Japan: A New Self-Defense Force Roleor Not?
chapter abstract
This chapter examines Japan's contribution to the international coalition
in Afghanistan. Tokyo supported coalition naval operations in the Indian
Ocean to restore its credibility after the international community
criticized Japan for exercising "checkbook diplomacy" during the 1991
Persian Gulf War when it contributed $13 billion to offset coalition
expenses instead of deploying military forces to the region. If Japan had
again assisted with only financial assistance, the Japan-United States
alliance could have been undermined and Japanese national security
threatened.
16Australia: Terrorism, Regional Security and the US Alliance
chapter abstract
This chapter argues that Australia joined the international coalition to
remove al Qaeda from their bases in Afghanistan; foster regional stability;
and bolster the strength of Australia's US alliance by supporting the US in
its pursuit of al-Qaeda. Australia supported action in Afghanistan to
remove the al Qaeda threat and to deny that transnational organization and
affiliated networks sanctuary to plan, arm and train in Afghanistan.
Australian government was also concerned about al-Qaeda's impact on
Australia's regional security. Lastly, Australian policy makers have sought
to maintain US regional presence, bolster Australia's alliance stocks, and
enhance the possibility of reciprocity from the larger power in alliance
relations.
17New Zealand: Fostering the U.S.-New Zealand Relationship
chapter abstract
Never large in a quantitative sense, New Zealand's military deployment to
Afghanistan is notable for its length and diplomatic significance. New
Zealand's experience of casualties was the reverse of most, with the
majority of New Zealand combat deaths coming in the last years of the
Provincial Reconstruction Team's deployment to Bamiyan. The most
domestically controversial part of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan,
the Special Forces, was ironically often the most welcomed by its coalition
partners. New Zealand's long commitment in Afghanistan formed a crucial
element in the improving US-NZ security relationship, elements of which had
been largely suspended since the mid-1980s. Afghanistan also provided the
temporary glue for closer New Zealand-NATO links.
18Pakistan: A Tale of Two Allies
chapter abstract
The role of Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror is unique. Unlike
other allies discussed in this volume, Pakistan has not contributed
military forces or other resources to support Coalition operations inside
Afghanistan. This chapter argues that the Pakistani military forces play
roles that affect Coalition operation in Afghanistan in several ways, both
positive and negative. First, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces
man the border outposts on the Durand Line, monitoring and at least
theoretically constraining movement by militants across the border. Second,
Pakistan's intelligence services have monitored and arrested members of
certain militant groups that threaten the Coalition in Afghanistan, and
that potentially threaten the homelands of Coalition partners. Third, and
much more controversially, Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies
provide sanctuary, shelter, and support for militant groups that actively
fight the Coalition.
19Russia: Friend or Foe on Afghanistan?
chapter abstract
This chapter argues that Russia shared the coalition's goal of creating a
stable Afghanistan to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics and the spread
of Islamist extremism, but Moscow also embraced the contradictory policy of
calling for US and International Security Assistance Force troops to depart
Afghanistan. Russia provided coalition forces with detailed intelligence
gained during Soviet military operations in the 1980s, and it worked with
several Central Asian nations to permit coalition non-lethal supplies to be
transported through their countries along three supply routes that
collectively formed the Northern Distribution Network.
20Going Forward.Lessons Learned
chapter abstract
The chapter reviews similarities and differences in the Afghanistan
conflict 2001-2014 drawn from the experiences of 13 selected country case
studies involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2
neighboring countries, and Afghanistan. It concludes that addressing
identified challenges in NATO's first role outside Europe has strengthened
the alliance in many respects. Less certain is the alliance preparedness
for future conflicts. The cooperation and collaboration of 50 diverse
nations (NATO members as well as non-members) that evolved during the
Afghanistan operations - at times bumpy, at times surprisingly smooth - set
a new standard for future operations from which much can be learned.
However, the road ahead will be difficult for Afghanistan and incorporating
lessons learned for NATO and its coalition allies will be challenging.