Phil Haun

Coercion, Survival, and War

Why Weak States Resist the United States

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival-but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 288
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Juli 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 236mm x 156mm x 22mm
• Gewicht: 509g
• ISBN-13: 9780804792837
• ISBN-10: 0804792836
• Artikelnr.: 41752565

Autorenporträt

Phil M. Haun is Professor of Aerospace Studies at Yale University and a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction
chapter abstract
This chapter introduces the question of why the United States so often
fails to coerce weak states. Coercion is defined as the threat of force or
restricted use of force to convince a target to comply with a challenger's
demands. In asymmetric interstate conflict a powerful challenger chooses
between accommodation, brute force or coercion. The chapter includes a
table and summary statistics for the thirty asymmetric crises between the
United States and weak states since World War II. The chapter considers
conventional non-rational and rational explanations for coercion failure
and introduces an alternative explanation based on a weak state's survival
concerns. The chapter concludes by reflecting on why the United States
would knowingly make coercive demands that threaten survival and offers an
explanation based on the desire to lower the diplomatic and political costs
of going to war.
2A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion
chapter abstract
This chapter develops a theory of asymmetric interstate coercion. A
coercive strategy includes compellent or deterrent demands, punishment or
denial threats, and costly signals. The determinants of coercion success
are measured, coercive diplomacy is considered where the use of force is
only threatened, and the relationship between economic sanctions and
coercion is discussed. A model of asymmetric coercion is developed where
demands, threats and costly signals are determined by the powerful
challenger and in response the weak target chooses whether to resist or
concede. In equilibrium, a coercive strategy should only be adopted when
the target is expected to concede. The coercion range depicts the set of
successful coercive demands for which the challenger prefers coercion to
accommodation or brute force and the target prefers concession to
resistance. The chapter concludes by discussing rational and non-rational
explanations for why coercion might still fail.
3Survival and Coercion Failure
chapter abstract
This chapter considers why powerful states issue high level demands of weak
states. Given a high probability of victory a powerful challenger must
expect high level concessions to prefer coercion to brute force. When
demands threaten the sovereignty of the weak state, however, it is likely
to resist. The unitary actor assumption for the weak state is relaxed to
also consider the survival concerns of its regime and regime leadership.
Rationally, a powerful challenger should not coerce when demands threaten a
target's survival. However, when the costs of coercion are low and when
there is uncertainty whether the target will concede then it may make sense
to coerce while preparing for war. Also, if the external costs for adopting
a brute force strategy are high, then first having the United Nations
Security Council issue coercive resolutions may decrease the diplomatic and
political costs for later going to war.
4The United States vs. Iraq: The Gulf and Iraq Wars
chapter abstract
This chapter considers two crises between the United States and Iraq. In
the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the United States adopted coercive
strategies which threatened the survival of Saddam's regime and the Iraqi
state. These crises test the limits for what coercion can achieve and
examine the tradeoffs between coercive and brute force strategies. In both
crises, U.S. administrations chose coercive strategies they did not intend
to have succeed in order to then implement the brute force strategies they
preferred. These two crises thus provides insight into the key questions
addressed by this book as to why the United States so often chooses
coercion, why coercion so often fails as weak states resist, and, knowing
this, why the U.S decision makers still prefer coercive strategies.
5The United States vs. Serbia: Bosnia and Kosovo
chapter abstract
This chapter examines two crises of the US against the Bosnian Serbs and
Serbia in 1992 and 1999, respectively. In both cases, coercive diplomacy
failed but coercion ultimately succeeded. The first crisis arose over
actions in the Bosnian Civil War from 1992 to 1995, whereby the United
States finally coerced the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a peace agreement
but could never compel them to give up territory until it had already been
taken by force. The second crisis arose over Serbia's treatment of Kosovar
Albanians and concluded when Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic finally
conceded Kosovo after a 78-day NATO air campaign. He conceded, however,
only when the expected economic costs to Serbia from the air campaign
outweighed the political value of maintaining control of Kosovo. This
crisis is a rigorous test of the survival hypothesis as Serbia eventually
conceded homeland territory while it still retained the means to resist.
6The United States vs. Libya: El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am Flight 103, and WMD
chapter abstract
This chapter considers three cases between the United States and Libya from
1981 until 2003. Libya's support of international terrorism triggered a
crisis for the United States, culminating in the El Dorado Canyon air raid
in April 1986. Coercion ultimately failed because of the mismatch between
demands and threats as an isolated Reagan administration could not maintain
the credible threat of force. The second case commenced with the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988. It concluded
with the extradition of two Libyan officials in 1999 to stand trial at The
Hague. Another crisis commenced in September of 2002 when British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, with the backing of George W. Bush, made overtures to
Muammar Qaddafi to resume negotiations over Libya's WMD. The case concluded
in December 2003 when Qaddafi abandoned Libya's nuclear, biological and
chemical ambitions.
7Conclusion
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the book's main argument that the United States,
because of its power advantage, has an incentive to make large coercive
demands of weak states that if conceded threaten the survival of the state,
the regime or its leadership. Due to international norms to first seek
negotiated settlements prior to war, the U.S. has an incentive to go to the
UN and adopt a coercive strategy the U.S. does not believe will, or does
not want to succeed, to obtain justification and support for a brute force
war. Alternative explanations based on non-rational behavior, uncertainty,
and commitment problems help to explain why crises arise and why coercive
diplomacy fails, but does not provide insight into when coercion is likely
to succeed or fail. The book concludes with implications for U.S. foreign
policy.