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  • Produktbild: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources
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Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources A Case Study from the Barents Sea Fisheries

Aus der Reihe Environment & Policy
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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

09.10.2012

Abbildungen

XVI, 187 p.

Verlag

Springer Netherland

Seitenzahl

187

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/1,2 cm

Gewicht

324 g

Auflage

2000

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-94-010-5783-7

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

09.10.2012

Abbildungen

XVI, 187 p.

Verlag

Springer Netherland

Seitenzahl

187

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/1,2 cm

Gewicht

324 g

Auflage

2000

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-94-010-5783-7

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag GmbH
Tiergartenstr. 17
69121 Heidelberg
DE

Email: ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources
  • Produktbild: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources
  • 1 Introduction.- Theoretical context — the debate to be addressed.- Empirical background — the Barents Sea and its fishermen.- Empirical context — the issues to be raised.- Methodology.- the structure of the book.- 2 The Interaction of Research Programmes in Social Science Studies of the Commons.- Lakatos and scientific research programmes.- two traditions in the study of common-pool resources.- A Growing Literature on the Commons?.- Conclusion: scientific growth as interaction between theoretical traditions.- 3 A Model of Compliance in Fisheries — Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application.- Background: the study of compliance.- Sources of compliance.- first-order and management-induced compliance.- two compliance mechanisms: coercive and discursive measures.- Management levels and subsystems of compliance.- an agenda for research.- 4 The Barents sea Fisheries — Resources, Jurisdiction and Management.- The Barents Sea fish resources.- The fishing industries of Northern Norway and Northwestern Russia.- the legal setting.- Norway’s fishery relations with other states.- The Russian-Norwegian fishery management regime.- Norwegian fisheries management.- Russian fisheries management.- 5 Compliance in the Barents Sea — a Preliminary Discussion.- Fishing activity in the Barents Sea.- Violation rates in the Barents Sea fisheries.- Do violation rates reflect actual compliance?.- First-order compliance.- Compliance as a result of coercive measures.- “Indirect coercion” in the Svalbard Zone.- Legitimacy and discursive measures.- An observer’s account of co-operative action in the Svalbard Zone.- Conclusion.- 6 How Fishermen Account for Compliance.- The interview setting.- A positive attitude towards the coast guard.- Legitimate regulations andprocedures.- Partly illegitimate research results.- Strict enforcement.- Self-induced compliance.- Conclusion.- 7 Co-Management and Communities in the Barents sea Fisheries.- Theoretical revisit: co-management and communities.- Co-management in Northwest Russian fisheries.- Co-management in Norwegian fisheries.- The Barents Sea fishing communities.- Co-management and compliance.- Conclusion.- 8 Investigation Revisited.- Methodology revisited: the stories fishermen tell.- Hypotheses revisited: discourse or guns?.- Epistemological Context Revisited: Contributions to the Scientific Debate.- 9 Concluding Remarks.- Co-management beyond “user-group participation”.- Co-management — a system-centric perspective?.- Implications of the methodological and epistemological choices Made.- References.