This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear…mehr
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.
Figures Tables Preface 1 Introduction 3 The Study of Economic Sanctions 4 The Study of International Cooperation 7 Methodology 10 Pt. 1 Theory and Data 13 2 Model and Hypotheses 15 A Model of Economic Sanctions 16 Identifying Cooperation Problems 25 What Explains Cooperation? 31 Bandwagoning 40 3 Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables 46 Measurement and Description: The Dependent Variable 46 Measurement and Description: Explanatory Variables 54 4 Estimating Models of Cooperation 61 Regression Analysis 62 Ordered-Probit Analysis 67 Event-Count Analysis 74 The Effect of Declining Hegemony 86 Pt. 2 Case Studies 93 5 Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions 99 Congress versus the President: U.S. Human-Rights Policy, 1973-76 101 The Carter Administration 106 Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks 111 Attitudes and Responses to U.S. Human-Rights Sanctions 119 Pinochet's Chile: U.S. Leadership or Resistance? 124 6 The Falkland Islands Conflict 131 The Falklands Crisis, 1982 132 The Falklands and the European Community 138 Sanctions and War: The Case of Ireland 153 Responses of the United States, Latin America, and Others 159 7 Western Technology-Export Controls 169 American, European, and Japanese Views on East-West Technology Transfer 171 Institutional Coordination of Export Controls: CoCom 185 Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1980 191 Responding to Dissident Trials, 1978 198 8 The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions 204 Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline 206 The Effect of Declining Hegemony 225 Siberian Gas and European Preferences 228 The Grain Embargo: Why It Mattered 234 9 Conclusion 241 Explaining International Cooperation on Economic Sanctions 241 Additional Findings 247 Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions 248 Notes 253 Bibliography 277 Index 293
Figures Tables Preface 1 Introduction 3 The Study of Economic Sanctions 4 The Study of International Cooperation 7 Methodology 10 Pt. 1 Theory and Data 13 2 Model and Hypotheses 15 A Model of Economic Sanctions 16 Identifying Cooperation Problems 25 What Explains Cooperation? 31 Bandwagoning 40 3 Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables 46 Measurement and Description: The Dependent Variable 46 Measurement and Description: Explanatory Variables 54 4 Estimating Models of Cooperation 61 Regression Analysis 62 Ordered-Probit Analysis 67 Event-Count Analysis 74 The Effect of Declining Hegemony 86 Pt. 2 Case Studies 93 5 Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions 99 Congress versus the President: U.S. Human-Rights Policy, 1973-76 101 The Carter Administration 106 Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks 111 Attitudes and Responses to U.S. Human-Rights Sanctions 119 Pinochet's Chile: U.S. Leadership or Resistance? 124 6 The Falkland Islands Conflict 131 The Falklands Crisis, 1982 132 The Falklands and the European Community 138 Sanctions and War: The Case of Ireland 153 Responses of the United States, Latin America, and Others 159 7 Western Technology-Export Controls 169 American, European, and Japanese Views on East-West Technology Transfer 171 Institutional Coordination of Export Controls: CoCom 185 Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1980 191 Responding to Dissident Trials, 1978 198 8 The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions 204 Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline 206 The Effect of Declining Hegemony 225 Siberian Gas and European Preferences 228 The Grain Embargo: Why It Mattered 234 9 Conclusion 241 Explaining International Cooperation on Economic Sanctions 241 Additional Findings 247 Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions 248 Notes 253 Bibliography 277 Index 293
Rezensionen
A major theoretical and substantive contribution to the study of international cooperation and the imposition of economic sanctions.
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