The United States Army's study of counterinsurgency operations is limited, with few notable exceptions, to those that occurred in the Third World from 1950 to the present day. Few American officers, NCOs or soldiers are familiar with other historical insurgencies, or the wars fought against them. The Anglo-Irish War (1916-1921) is a prime example of an overlooked and poorly understood insurgency fought along nationalistic lines. Previous works on the subject focused upon the causes, major figures or outcomes from the war. Authors spent little time examining how the British and Irish utilized intelligence. This monograph employs numerous primary sources to determine the manner and method used by the British to conduct intelligence operations against the IRA and Sinn Fein in Ireland. It compares and contrasts British intelligence methodology, organization and policies against that employed by Irish nationalist forces. Additionally, it describes and analyzes the reactions from the Irish people, the IRA and Sinn Fein. Combatants in the 21st century will fight for ethnic and national causes. Ideology, in the form of religion or politics, may play a part but nationalism will be the defining factor. This monograph elucidates intelligence lessons learned that may be applicable in future wars.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.