Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008). Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.
Inhaltsangabe
* Contents * 1: Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne: Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction * 2: Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet: The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology * 3: Terry Horgan: From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed * 4: Uriah Kriegel: Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content * 5: Joseph Levine: On The Phenomenology of Thought * 6: Michelle Montague: The Phenomenology of Particularity * 7: David Pitt: Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content * 8: Jesse Prinz: The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology * 9: William Robinson: A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology * 10: Christopher Shields: On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia * 11: Charles Siewert: Phenomenal Thought * 12: Maja Spener: Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology * 13: Galen Strawson: Cognitive Phenomenology: real life * 14: Michael Tye and Briggs Wright: Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? * 15: David Woodruff-Smith: Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking
* Contents * 1: Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne: Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction * 2: Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet: The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology * 3: Terry Horgan: From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed * 4: Uriah Kriegel: Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content * 5: Joseph Levine: On The Phenomenology of Thought * 6: Michelle Montague: The Phenomenology of Particularity * 7: David Pitt: Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content * 8: Jesse Prinz: The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology * 9: William Robinson: A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology * 10: Christopher Shields: On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia * 11: Charles Siewert: Phenomenal Thought * 12: Maja Spener: Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology * 13: Galen Strawson: Cognitive Phenomenology: real life * 14: Michael Tye and Briggs Wright: Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? * 15: David Woodruff-Smith: Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking
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