The large majority of the papers in the present volume were collected by Bergmann under the title "Logic and Reality" which indicates the theme of an ontological foundation for logic or of an ontological analysis of analyticity. Actually, the theme is to be found in almost all of the papers of this volume. When Quine published his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction, Bergmann defended it vehemently. In contrast to Carnap whom Quine criticised Bergmann takes "analytic" in the narrow sense of "logical truth". However, he later extended the area of the analytic a by including truths (falsehoods) expressing the intentional connection between mental states and the facts they purportedly intend. As can be gathered from Selected Papers I Bergmann is a dualist and became more and more interested in intentionality. Another element of the world's form usually not recognised and discovered by Bergmann is the exemplification tie or exemplification nexus which connects individuals and relational and non-relational universals. Intentionality and exemplification are brought together by Bergmann with logical conjunction and disjunction which he considers as connections in reality and not mere symbols. Moreover, Bergmann offers ontological assays of negation and quantification, of variables and their order. Bergmann holds that the recognition of the logical and categorial form of the world including the intentional connection is crucial to arrive at a tenable epistemological realism.