A study of the classical aggregation problems that arise in social choice theory, voting theory, and group decision-making under uncertainty.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Shmuel Nitzan is Sir Isaac Wolfson Professor of Economics at Bar-Ilan University, Israel. He is the author (with Jacob Paroush) of Collective Decision Making (1986) and (with Gil Epstein) of Endogenous Public Policy and Contests (2007). His research focuses on political economy, social choice, collective decision-making, public economics, and voting theory.
Inhaltsangabe
List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgments Part I. Introduction: 1. The reason for the problems 2. Brief overview of the problems 3. The relationship between preferences and choice Part II. Different Preferences: 4. Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems 5. The desirable collective decision rule: axiomatization 6. Rule selection based on the compromise with the unanimity criterion 7. Paradoxes of voting 8. Majority tyranny and expression of preference intensity 9. The problem of inefficient provision of public goods 10. Do individuals reveal their true preferences? Part III. Identical Preferences - Different Decisional Skills: 11. Which rule is better: the expert rule or the simple majority rule? Decisional errors in dichotomous choice and Condorcet's jury theorem 12. The optimal decision rule under uncertain dichotomous choice References Index.
List of figures; List of tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; Part I. Introduction: 1. The reason for the problems; 2. Brief overview of the problems; 3. The relationship between preferences and choice; Part II. Different Preferences: 4. Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems; 5. The desirable collective decision rule: axiomatization; 6. Rule selection based on the compromise with the unanimity criterion; 7. Paradoxes of voting; 8. Majority tyranny and expression of preference intensity; 9. The problem of inefficient provision of public goods; 10. Do individuals reveal their true preferences?; Part III. Identical Preferences - Different Decisional Skills: 11. Which rule is better: the expert rule or the simple majority rule? Decisional errors in dichotomous choice and Condorcet's jury theorem; 12. The optimal decision rule under uncertain dichotomous choice; References; Index.
List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgments Part I. Introduction: 1. The reason for the problems 2. Brief overview of the problems 3. The relationship between preferences and choice Part II. Different Preferences: 4. Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems 5. The desirable collective decision rule: axiomatization 6. Rule selection based on the compromise with the unanimity criterion 7. Paradoxes of voting 8. Majority tyranny and expression of preference intensity 9. The problem of inefficient provision of public goods 10. Do individuals reveal their true preferences? Part III. Identical Preferences - Different Decisional Skills: 11. Which rule is better: the expert rule or the simple majority rule? Decisional errors in dichotomous choice and Condorcet's jury theorem 12. The optimal decision rule under uncertain dichotomous choice References Index.
List of figures; List of tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; Part I. Introduction: 1. The reason for the problems; 2. Brief overview of the problems; 3. The relationship between preferences and choice; Part II. Different Preferences: 4. Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems; 5. The desirable collective decision rule: axiomatization; 6. Rule selection based on the compromise with the unanimity criterion; 7. Paradoxes of voting; 8. Majority tyranny and expression of preference intensity; 9. The problem of inefficient provision of public goods; 10. Do individuals reveal their true preferences?; Part III. Identical Preferences - Different Decisional Skills: 11. Which rule is better: the expert rule or the simple majority rule? Decisional errors in dichotomous choice and Condorcet's jury theorem; 12. The optimal decision rule under uncertain dichotomous choice; References; Index.
Rezensionen
'This is a first rate book, covering basic social choice theory (Arrow, Sen, Condorcet, Borda, etc.), as well as group choice when individuals seek the same objective but disagree on how to bring it about - an area in which Shmuel Nitzan himself has made seminal contributions. The material is well presented. This lucid treatment is ideal for newcomers to the field, but it will also be a valuable resource for graduate students. For every page of text there is half a page of exercises with solutions.' Donald Campbell, College of William and Mary
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