Paul Weirich

Collective Rationality

Equilibrium in Cooperative Games

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where agents have rationally prepared for joint action.

---

Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 284
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Juni 2012
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 15mm
• Gewicht: 436g
• ISBN-13: 9780199929016
• ISBN-10: 0199929017
• Artikelnr.: 57033722

Autorenporträt

Paul Weirich is Curators' Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia

Inhaltsangabe

1. Rationality Writ Large
1.1. Collective Acts
1.2. Method
1.3. Guide
2. Agents and Acts
2.1. Agents
2.2. Acts
2.3. Control
2.4. Evaluability
3. Rationality
3.1. Metatheory
3.2. Attainability
3.3. Comprehensiveness
3.4. Compositionality
4. Groups
4.1. Extension
4.2. Efficiency
4.3. Collective Utility
4.4. Compositionality
5. Games of Strategy
5.1. Games
5.2. Solutions
5.3. Standards
6. Equilibrium
6.1. Standards and Procedures
6.2. Utility Maximization
6.3. Self-Support
6.4. Strategic Equilibrium
6.5. Realization of an Equilibrium
6.6. Appendix: Realization of a Nash Equilibrium
7. Coordination
7.1. Strategy and Learning
7.2. Changing the Rules
7.3. An Efficient Equilibrium
7.4. Preparation
7.5. Intentions
8. Cooperative Games
8.1. Joint Action
8.2. Opportunities for Joint Action
8.3. Coalitional Games
8.4. The Core
8.5. An Empty Core
9. Strategy for Coalitions
9.1. A Coalition's Incentives
9.2. Paths of Incentives
9.3. Strategic Equilibrium in Coalitional Games
10. Illustrations and Comparisons
10.1. The Majority-Rule Game
10.2. Comparisons
10.3. Conflict
10.4. Collective Standards
11. Compositionality
11.1. Underlying Games
11.2. Confirmation
11.3. Agreement Games
11.4. The Core and Utility Maximization
11.5. Strategic Equilibrium and Self-Support
12. Implications
12.1. Social Institutions
12.2. Strategic Equilibrium and Institutions
12.3. Theoretical Unity
12.4. Future Research
Notes
References
Index