This textbook uses game theory to explain common resource management. It is intended for students in economics, business, public policy, and other social sciences, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, taking courses in natural resource economics and management, or in environmental economics.
This textbook uses game theory to explain common resource management. It is intended for students in economics, business, public policy, and other social sciences, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, taking courses in natural resource economics and management, or in environmental economics.
Ana Espinola-Arredondo is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Introduction 2. Common pool resources in a static setting 3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting 4. Entry deterrence in the commons 5. Repeated interaction in the commons 6. Commons under incomplete information 7. Signaling in the commons Appendix A: game theory tools Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.
Preface 1. Introduction 2. Common pool resources in a static setting 3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting 4. Entry deterrence in the commons 5. Repeated interaction in the commons 6. Commons under incomplete information 7. Signaling in the commons Appendix A: game theory tools Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.
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