Douglas W Portmore

Commonsense Consequentialism

Wherein Morality Meets Rationality

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Hurst & Co.
• Seitenzahl: 288
• Erscheinungstermin: 2. November 2011
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 236mm x 155mm x 28mm
• Gewicht: 544g
• ISBN-13: 9780199794539
• ISBN-10: 0199794537
• Artikelnr.: 33371688

Autorenporträt

Douglas W. Portmore is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he also writes on wellbeing, posthumous harm, and the nonidentity problem.

Inhaltsangabe

* Abbreviations
* 1. Why I Am Not a Utilitarian
* 1.1 Utilitarianism: The good, the bad, and the ugly
* 1.2 The plan for the rest of the book
* 1.3 My aims
* 1.4 Objective oughts and objective reasons
* 1.5 Conventions that I will follow throughout the book
* 2. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism
* 2.1 The too-demanding objection: How moral rationalism leads us to
reject utilitarianism
* 2.2 The argument against utilitarianism from moral rationalism
* 2.3 How moral rationalism compels us to accept consequentialism
* 2.4 What is consequentialism?
* 2.5 The presumptive case for moral rationalism
* 2.6 Some concluding remarks
* 3. The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons
* 3.1 Getting clear on what the view is
* 3.2 Clearing up some misconceptions about the view
* 3.3 Scanlon's putative counterexamples to the view
* 3.4 Arguments for the view
* 4. Consequentializing Commonsense Morality
* 4.1 How to consequentialize
* 4.2 The deontic equivalence thesis
* 4.3 Beyond the deontic equivalence thesis: How consequentialist
theories can