Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.
Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg; Part I. Design Processes: 2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster; 3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg; Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions: 4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast; 5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken; 6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom; 7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl; Part III. Issues in Institutional Design: 8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden; 9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel; 10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum; 11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino; 12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele; 13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.
1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg; Part I. Design Processes: 2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster; 3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg; Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions: 4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast; 5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken; 6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom; 7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl; Part III. Issues in Institutional Design: 8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden; 9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel; 10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum; 11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino; 12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele; 13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.
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