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The Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to transforming its conventional warfare capabilities. At the same time, DoD must increase its emphasis on irregular warfare. This ambitious agenda raises some questions. Are there limits to military transformation? Or, if it seems obvious that there must be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they arise, and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish the transformation that the U.S. military is capable of? If limits to military change and transformation exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and strategy? Professor David Tucker offers some answers to these questions in this Letort Paper by analyzing the efforts of the French, British, and Americans to deal with irregular threats after World War II. He concludes that there are limits to transformation and offers an analysis of the effects of these limits on policy and strategy for the war on terrorism.