Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.
Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.
Stephen Finlay is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. He is the author of a number of articles on metaethics and moral psychology. Originally from New Zealand, he lives in Pomona, California with his wife and three daughters.
Inhaltsangabe
Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. A Good Word to Start With Chapter 3. The Probable Meaning of 'Ought' Chapter 4. Explaining Reasons Chapter 5. Pragmatics and Practicality Chapter 6. Multiple Ends Chapter 7. Categorical and Final Chapter 8. A Disagreeable Problem Chapter 9. Conclusion
Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. A Good Word to Start With Chapter 3. The Probable Meaning of 'Ought' Chapter 4. Explaining Reasons Chapter 5. Pragmatics and Practicality Chapter 6. Multiple Ends Chapter 7. Categorical and Final Chapter 8. A Disagreeable Problem Chapter 9. Conclusion
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