Essays contest notion of the absolute preeminence of judicial review in constitutional interpretation, analyzing the role of Congress as a constitutional interpreter and responsible constitutional agent.
Essays contest notion of the absolute preeminence of judicial review in constitutional interpretation, analyzing the role of Congress as a constitutional interpreter and responsible constitutional agent.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Neal Devins is Goodrich Professor of Law, Professor of Government, and Director of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary School of Law. Among his books are Shaping Constitutional Values: The Supreme Court, Elected Government, and the Abortion Dispute; The Democratic Constitution (coauthored with Louis Fisher); and A Year at the Supreme Court (coedited with Davison Douglas and published by Duke University Press). Keith E. Whittington is Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University. He is the author of Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning and Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments vii Introduction / Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington 1 Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789–1861 / David P. Currie 18 Congressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation / Bruce G. Peabody 39 Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies / Louis Fisher 64 Hearing about the Constitution in Congressional Committees / Keith E. Whittington 87 The Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional Interpretation / Michael J. Gerhardt 110 Lawyers in Congress / John C. Yoo 131 Congressional Responses to Judicial Review / J. Mitchell Pickerill 151 Court, Congress, and Civil Rights / Michael J. Klarman 173 Quasi-Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes / William N. Eskridge Jr. and John Ferejohn 198 Congressional Fact Finding and the Scope of Judicial Review / Neal Devins 220 Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress / Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule 242 Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies / Mark Tushnet 269 Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures / Barbara Sinclair 293 About the Contributors 313 Index 315
Acknowledgments vii Introduction / Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington 1 Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789–1861 / David P. Currie 18 Congressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation / Bruce G. Peabody 39 Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies / Louis Fisher 64 Hearing about the Constitution in Congressional Committees / Keith E. Whittington 87 The Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional Interpretation / Michael J. Gerhardt 110 Lawyers in Congress / John C. Yoo 131 Congressional Responses to Judicial Review / J. Mitchell Pickerill 151 Court, Congress, and Civil Rights / Michael J. Klarman 173 Quasi-Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes / William N. Eskridge Jr. and John Ferejohn 198 Congressional Fact Finding and the Scope of Judicial Review / Neal Devins 220 Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress / Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule 242 Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies / Mark Tushnet 269 Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures / Barbara Sinclair 293 About the Contributors 313 Index 315
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