This book offers ways to overcome problems that arise because voters, politicians and bureaucrats pursue selfish interests rather than the general interest in their political behaviour. It combines previously published ideas about charging people the costs of their political actions and selling insurance against unfavourable political outcomes, with new ideas about competing legislatures and incentives for generating efficient political outcomes. The book includes new theorems about the mechanisms that are discussed, as well as a proposed constitution and its rationale.
This book offers ways to overcome problems that arise because voters, politicians and bureaucrats pursue selfish interests rather than the general interest in their political behaviour. It combines previously published ideas about charging people the costs of their political actions and selling insurance against unfavourable political outcomes, with new ideas about competing legislatures and incentives for generating efficient political outcomes. The book includes new theorems about the mechanisms that are discussed, as well as a proposed constitution and its rationale.
NICOLAUS TIDEMAN is Professor of Economics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA.
Inhaltsangabe
List of Tables List of Figures Acknowledgements Foreword The Emerging Country: Appendix: Are Governments Really Inefficient? Ways to Overcome the Public Goods Problem Appendix: Notes on Altruism, Ideology, and Anarchy The Draft Constitution and its Rationale Appendix: The Draft Constitution Perspectives and Alternatives The Thompson Insurance Mechanism Adjustments for Income Effects Appendix: Formal Proofs Why Nash Solutions are Not Solutions Notes Bibliography Index
List of Tables List of Figures Acknowledgements Foreword The Emerging Country: Appendix: Are Governments Really Inefficient? Ways to Overcome the Public Goods Problem Appendix: Notes on Altruism, Ideology, and Anarchy The Draft Constitution and its Rationale Appendix: The Draft Constitution Perspectives and Alternatives The Thompson Insurance Mechanism Adjustments for Income Effects Appendix: Formal Proofs Why Nash Solutions are Not Solutions Notes Bibliography Index
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